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Abstract 
Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower’s style of leadership and mentality transformed from a 
heroic leadership philosophy to a managerial leadership philosophy before the United States’ 
entry into World War II in 1941.  From the late-nineteenth century through World War II, the US 
Army underwent the same transformation.  The US Army’s shifting focus from heroic to 
managerial leadership enabled Eisenhower to gain additional administrative education to 
enhance his managerial skills.  Exploring Eisenhower’s military career provides a window to 
investigate the transformation of officer professionalism that was occurring in the early twentieth 
century.  He interacted with leaders still firmly planted in “heroic-age leadership,” but he was 
also mentored by those that accepted or even promoted the “managerial” concept of leadership. 
 The Army’s concurrent use of distinct styles of leadership, during a time of 
transformation, is not unlike the concept of “paradigm shift” used by Thomas Kuhn.  New ideas 
do not merely displace old ideas; instead, the two can exist simultaneously with one another.  
The term “heroic” includes the concepts of fraternal, seniority-based organization, and deference 
to tradition as well as an individual piece which includes traits such as courage, valor, and 
personal image.  On the other hand, the term “managerial” challenges traditional notions of the 
military, focuses on innovative solutions to military problems, and favors bureaucratization.  
Eisenhower is an excellent example to illustrate the way in which the US Army moved from a 
focus on heroic leadership toward managerial leadership.  That Eisenhower was able to hone his 
administrative skills at army schools, such as the Army War College, illustrates that the Army 
began focusing on the science of leadership over the art of war. 
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1 
Introduction 
At 7:15 a.m. on June 6, 1944., General Eisenhower’s orderly, Sergeant Michael 
“Mickey” J. McKeogh, found the General sitting quietly in his trailer reading a western novel.  
Eisenhower had gone without sleep and had filled his ashtray with cigarette butts.1  On this 
morning, he could do nothing but wait for the reports of the airborne operations and landings on 
the beaches of Normandy.  He had been preparing for this invasion since his time in the War 
Department in 1942 and had built a team that helped manage the opening of a front in France.  
Eisenhower’s team consisted of “heroic” leaders such as General George S. Patton and Field 
Marshal Bernard Montgomery.  His team also consisted of “managerial” leaders such as General 
Omar Bradley.  Just as a football squad needs specialists who integrate to make the team 
stronger, so Eisenhower believed he needed a diverse group of leaders to ensure that he had 
“fighting men” on the front lines and managers to point them in the right direction.  At 6:40 a.m., 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force’s (SHAEF) advanced command received the 
first report of the airborne operations executed behind enemy lines in Normandy.2  They were 
generally optimistic.  Reports received from the Normandy landings were unbearably slow and 
indicated mixed successes and failures.  The most harrowing reports came from Omaha Beach, 
where the collapse of the beachhead seemed a distinct possibility.  Eisenhower could do nothing 
to help the landings on the beaches.  He had been elevated to being an armchair general.  He had 
built his team, organized his armies, supported training and equipment fielding.  Eisenhower had 
done everything taught to him as a managerial leader, but the Normandy landings were a 
 
1 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower, A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 531. 
2 D’Este, Eisenhower, 530. 
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soldier’s battle, not a general’s.  As an embodiment of the U.S. Army’s shifting attitudes towards 
a managerial style of leadership, the Normandy landings put Eisenhower’s managerial, 
diplomatic, and logistic skills to the test. 
 Major General Leonard T. Gerow, V Corps commander, was awaiting the initial reports 
on the amphibious command ship USS Ancon along with Major General Clarence Huebner, 1st 
Infantry Division Commander.  After two hours, there was still no confirmation of any successes 
nor word that any beach landing had reached its objectives.  Gerow and Huebner soon learned 
the landings on Omaha were on the verge of total failure.  Although three-quarters of the radios 
with the 116th Infantry Regiment did not work, the two generals began to receive short and 
gloomy reports.  These reports included: “Too many vehicles on the beach, send more combat 
troops, thirty landing craft tanks waiting offshore, troops pinned down on the beach.” Huebner 
pushed the 18th Infantry Regiment to land immediately as reinforcements.  Gerow, always 
“studiously calm under pressure,” pressed for more information and sent his assistant chief of 
staff to conduct reconnaissance of the landings to gain any new information.3  Both Huebner and 
Gerow were closer to the action, and knowledge and intelligence were critical in their decisions 
to organize and direct reinforcements. 
 On Omaha Beach, the commander of L Company, 16th Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, 
Captain John R. Armellino, made a “successful” landing.  Though they had made it onto the 
beach successfully, their mission still had many objectives remaining.  The landing craft of his 
company took a beating carrying the troops to the beach, with several landing craft getting hit by 
German mortar and artillery fire.  He noticed immediately that the air support had missed most 
 
3 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945 (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 78-9. 
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of the obstacles and German fortifications.  Armellino’s craft came under intense German fire 
approximately one-quarter mile from the beach and continued until the ramp dropped onto the 
beach.  Immediately several members of his company fell wounded or killed on the boat and 
shore.  The German machine guns were set up with overlapping fields of fire that peppered 
Armellino’s men.  Many of the green American recruits never made it to the bluff.  The more 
seasoned soldiers from the African and Sicilian campaigns knew proper movement and assault 
techniques to avoid the withering German fire.  Armellino only had 125 of his original 200-man 
company by the time they made it to the rally point.4  
Armellino’s actions and the actions of his lieutenants illustrate a mix of managerial and 
heroic styles of leadership.  He was able to combine his knowledge of the operations with the 
complex problems presented in front of him.  Armellino placed himself in a position in which he 
could direct his company and began to organize the chaos by directing soldiers and subordinate 
leaders to execute tasks.  These were not small tasks, and the actions taken by his junior officers 
exemplify heroic leadership styles.  Armellino’s subordinate leaders demonstrated heroic 
leadership by courageously exposing themselves to enemy fire, and gallantly leading soldiers 
into the fight.  He sent First Lieutenant Jimmie W. Monteith to take a group of soldiers to knock 
out the German pillboxes.  They were successful, but Monteith was killed in action while leading 
soldiers into the fight and was one of twelve Medal of Honor receipts from the day’s efforts.5  As 
 
4 John R. Armellino, “Captain John R. Armellino 6 June 1944,” American D-Day online, October 13, 2019. 
http://www.americandday.org/Veterans/Armellino_John_R.html. 
5 Lieutenant Monteith was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on the beach.  His citation 
bears reading to illustrate the “heroic” language used (emphasis added by author), “For conspicuous gallantry and 
intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty on 6 June 1944, near Colleville-Sur-Mer, France. 1st Lt. Monteith 
landed with the initial assault waves on the coast of France under heavy enemy fire. Without regard to his own 
personal safety he continually moved up and down the beach reorganizing men for further assault. He then led the 
assault over a narrow protective ledge and across the flat, exposed terrain to the comparative safety of a cliff. 
Retracing his steps across the field to the beach, he moved over to where 2 tanks were buttoned up and blind under 
violent enemy artillery and machinegun fire. Completely exposed to the intense fire, 1st Lt. Monteith led the tanks 
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tanks arrived on the beach, Armellino began directing tank fire on the German fortifications and 
took an anti-tank round, which wounded him.  Medics quickly recovered and moved him to an 
evacuation staging area where Armellino continued his efforts to manage and direct the soldiers 
landing and preparing the evacuation of critically wounded soldiers.6  The chaos and noise were 
constant, and the managerial and heroic leadership styles combined to ensure the success of the 
landings. 
Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower’s style of leadership and mentality were transformed 
from a heroic leadership style to a managerial leadership style before the United States’ entry 
into World War II in 1941.  The U.S. Army’s shift of focus from heroic to managerial leadership 
enabled Eisenhower to gain additional education in the art and science of administration which 
eventually enhanced his managerial skill and altered his perceptions of the leadership style 
needed for senior commanders and staff officers.  The way in which Eisenhower’s leadership 
style and views came to align with a managerial approach points to a transformation that 
occurred within himself, as well as within the U.S. Army.  Examining Eisenhower’s military 
career provides a window into a new understanding of officer professionalism.  He interacted 
with leaders who were still firmly committed to “heroic-age leadership,” but he was also 
mentored by those who accepted or even promoted the “managerial” concept of leadership. 
 
on foot through a minefield and into firing positions. Under his direction several enemy positions were destroyed. 
He then rejoined his company and under his leadership his men captured an advantageous position on the hill. 
Supervising the defense of his newly won position against repeated vicious counterattacks, he continued to ignore 
his own personal safety, repeatedly crossing the 200 or 300 yards of open terrain under heavy fire to strengthen 
links in his defensive chain. When the enemy succeeded in completely surrounding 1st Lt. Monteith and his unit and 
while leading the fight out of the situation, 1st Lt. Monteith was killed by enemy fire. The courage, gallantry, and 
intrepid leadership displayed by 1st Lt. Monteith is worthy of emulation.” Jimmie W. Monteith, “Medal of Honor 
Citation of Lieutenant Jimmie W. Monteith, 6 June 1944”, National Medal of Honor Museum Online, October 13, 
2019.   https://mohmuseum.org/medal_of_honor/monteith-jimmie-w/. 
6 Armellino, American D-Day online. 
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Eisenhower’s managerial skills propelled him to leadership during a time of “special flowering 
in World War II.”7   
The Army’s concurrent use of distinct styles of leadership, during a time of 
transformation, recalls the concept of “paradigm shift” advanced by Thomas Kuhn.  Kuhn 
described the way in which scientific revolutions have taken place over time.  New ideas do not 
merely displace old ideas; instead, the two can exist simultaneously with one another.  He gave 
various reasons why old ideas continue to exist.  For example, some senior scientists may merely 
choose not to change, and some old ideas may continue to work as simple explanations in some 
small and casual experiments. Newton’s Laws of Motion was thus accepted and disregarded 
when they were put forward.  The concept of a paradigm shift fits how managerial leadership 
arose where heroic leadership had long been dominant.  The use of a paradigm also helps to 
show that the terms “heroic” and “managerial” are not necessarily opposites, in the same way 
that the Theory of General Relativity is not opposite from Newton’s Laws of Motion.  The rise of 
something new did not negate the continuation of something old.8 
This thesis has three main chapters.  Chapter One describes the way the U.S. Army of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries changed drastically from an army motivated by heroic special 
action to one whose performance depended on an increasingly effective organization.  The U.S. 
Army faced many problems following the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars.  These 
problems, many of which General Emory Upton had already pointed out following the American 
Civil War, included the Army’s system of professional military education for its officers.  
 
7 Russell F. Weigley, “The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Soldier, the Statesman, and the 
Military Historian,” Journal of Military History 63, no. 4 (October 1999), 808. 
8 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).  
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Secretary of War Elihu Root stepped in to make many of these radical reforms to the Army, 
which set the environment in which Dwight D. Eisenhower received his military education. 
Chapter Two focuses on Eisenhower’s military, professional, and personal experiences 
and education.  In his time at West Point, Eisenhower showed disdain for tradition and military 
regulation, and these early years provided the first glimpse of his disposition toward more open-
minded, or managerial leadership.  Early in his career, the Army’s perspective was channeled 
through a heroic lens, and necessarily so junior an officer as Eisenhower was viewed as 
unsubstantial.  It was not until Eisenhower became commander of Camp Colt during World War 
I that he was able to demonstrate his administrative abilities.  Army service schools refined his 
raw managerial skill and his attendance at the Command and General Staff School was a 
watershed moment for Eisenhower.  His vision of leadership philosophy became more cemented 
in favor of managerial leadership.  The time he spent serving under prominent generals, such as 
Douglas MacArthur, John Pershing, and Fox Conner, proved immensely valuable in providing 
Eisenhower an education that was both personal and professional.  
Chapter Three explores Eisenhower’s experiences immediately before and during World 
War II, his emergence as an expert managerial leader, and the way in which General Marshall 
gambled on Eisenhower’s leadership philosophy during World War II.  For the Army, the 
Louisiana Maneuvers provided the opportunity to test new unit structures and doctrine and to 
weigh the potential of younger officers, such as Eisenhower, Patton, and Mark Clark, for future 
generalship.  Marshall and President Franklin Roosevelt gambled on managerial leadership and 
chose Eisenhower to take command in Europe, sending him first to North Africa to earn essential 
combat experience before taking overall command of allied forces.  D-Day served as the 
culmination of education and experience that enabled Eisenhower to put together the best team to 
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execute a successful invasion of Europe.  Eisenhower applied the lessons he learned in how he 
built and sustained allied and staff relationships. 
Sociologist Morris Janowitz defined “managerial leadership” as reflecting the “scientific 
and pragmatic dimensions of war-making.” Managerial leaders are the military professionals 
who tend to be those with “effective links to civilian society.” In contrast, “heroic leadership,” 
according to Janowitz, entailed the “perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who 
embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.”9  Janowitz argued that heroic 
leaders tended to come from upper or middle-class society, as well as prominent military 
families.  For example, Janowitz saw General Douglas MacArthur as fitting the heroic mold.  
MacArthur was an intelligent officer with a certain panache or flair and individuality. The heavy 
personal emphasis on the valor of the individual, on maintaining one’s image, and on strict 
adherence to traditional U.S. Army methods landed him squarely in the heroic group.  Officers 
who came from more humble origins, including people from the working class or rural areas, 
generally proved more disposed to the managerial type of leadership.  Janowitz aptly argued that 
Eisenhower was predisposed to the managerial leadership category as Eisenhower came from a 
humble, rural Kansas background and later did not readily conform to U.S. Army traditions or 
regulations.10 
Janowitz’s terms “managerial” and “heroic” were meant to describe differences in actual 
construction of styles of leadership and relationship to authority.  Janowitz also used the term 
“managerial” to include the notion of manipulation, persuasion, or the influence of others or 
events.  The use of manipulation here does not imply a negative connotation.  It is also slightly 
 
9Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 21. 
10Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 154-60. 
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different than the “art of persuasion” in that one usually persuades another person, but one can 
“manipulate” events to further one’s goals.  Manipulation mirrored the techniques used by 
society in the industrial growth of the late19th and early 20th centuries.  By this argument, 
Janowitz saw the military as more reflective of society and less resistant to change, as many in 
society had come to believe. He also included concepts such as seniority-based hierarchy, 
fraternal brotherhood, deference to tradition, authoritative, and dominative to help define the 
term heroic.11  Authority is derived from an officer’s position within the U.S. Army and not 
necessarily on mutual respect from their subordinates.  Acting on one’s authority, where mutual 
respect does not exist, is domination.  Janowitz saw a correlation between heroic and managerial 
leadership and the use of domination and manipulation, respectively. 12  This thesis applies 
Janowitz’s sociological understanding of the “heroic” and the “managerial” to the study of the 
U.S. military. 
For this thesis, the term “heroic” includes fraternal organizations based on seniority, as 
well as deference to tradition.  These concepts identify the institutional part of heroic leadership.  
Hazing, either plebes at West Point or soldiers newly assigned to a unit, is an excellent example 
of tradition.  Senior leaders helping friends or helping former classmates and helping out the sons 
of friends is an example of an organization according to fraternal order.  Seemingly brash actions 
and an emphasis on courage, valor, and image constitute the personal or individual part of the 
term “heroic.”  MacArthur’s iconic image of wearing a scarf along with a corn-cob pipe is an 
excellent example of the personal image factor of heroic leadership.  Patton’s popularity among 
 
11 Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace (Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1975), 225-27. 
12 Janowitz, Military Conflict, 221-23. 
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his troops, willingness to expose himself to enemy fire, and his being perceived as a “soldiers’ 
leader” also highlight heroic leadership.  Heroic leaders emphasize qualities such as bravery, 
narcissism, being a “soldiers’ leader,” dominance, and favor the status quo.  They also favor 
ideas such as tradition, fraternity, authoritarian, self-image, and the “fighting spirit.” 
In contrast, the term “managerial” challenges many traditional notions of the military, 
focuses on innovative solutions to military problems and favors bureaucratization, which was the 
hotbed for innovation.  Managerial leaders accentuate qualities such as organization, open-
minded thinking, compromising, and attention to detail.  They also favor concepts such as 
meritocracy, negotiation, team building, and diplomacy.  This does not mean that heroic leaders 
cannot have these qualities.  Eisenhower’s dislike of hazing and discipline while at West Point 
was a sign of his discomfort with behaviors favored by tradition.  Both Eisenhower’s and 
Marshall’s emphasis on younger generals demonstrated the way they challenged the seniority-
based organization.  Marshall’s selection of Eisenhower over Patton, who was the more senior in 
rank and years, also exemplifies “managerial.”  Managerial leadership was developing in the 
whole of society and not just in the military, and it was apparent in the trend toward 
professionalization in many professions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  That 
Eisenhower was able to hone his bureaucratic skills at Army schools, such as the Army War 
College, shows that the Army began focusing on the science of leadership.  This science of 
leadership called for attention to detail of logistics, diplomacy, and the sophisticated numerical 
breakdown of material strength weighed against the enemy.   
In Eisenhower, the heroic and managerial styles of leadership overlapped.  Eisenhower 
showed excellent managerial skill while still leveraging the fraternal order within the Army to 
shape his staff and command teams.  Eisenhower’s ability to build teams and to offer 
10 
compromises and his emphasis on “we” promoted a spirit of cooperation or “buy-in.”  He is a 
managerial leader because he used managerial traits to a higher degree, such as team-building 
and diplomacy, than heroic leadership traits such as showmanship and dominative authority. 
Historian Carol Reardon aptly shows the shift from a traditional military towards one that 
reflected the society’s new commitment to professionalization at the end of the 19th century.13  
She argues that a realignment in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that called for a 
professionalization of the officer corps specifically required changes in the institutions at which 
officers were educated, such as the creation of the Army War College and expanding West 
Point’s training for officers.  The reforms’ outcomes are best illustrated by the class of 1915, 
Eisenhower’s graduating class begot more generals than any other class in history.  The class of 
1915 was one of the first classes to be eligible for all these newly reformed schools.  Their 
timing also provided the opportunity for gained experiences as junior officers during World War 
I.  The class of 1915 was early enough to serve during World War I but young enough to 
continue service during World War II.  Military reforms and specific timing of significant 
international conflict provided graduating classes of the 1910s with a great opportunity in which 
the class of 1915 achieved the highest number of generals.  Reardon examines the military 
reforms of this period and the individuals and concepts that influenced them, such as Brigadier 
General Emory Upton and Secretary of War, and later State, Elihu Root.  Upton served in the 
U.S. Army from 1861 to 1881 and wrote influential works advocating army reform.14  Elihu 
 
13 Carol Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the uses of Military History (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1990). 
14 Two of the most useful works for this essay by Emory Upton are The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing 
Official Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and 
England (NY: D. Appleton & Co., 1878) and The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1904) which was published after his death.  
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Root served as Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904 following the Spanish-American war in 
1898 through the Philippine War, which officially ended in 1902. He also served as Secretary of 
State from 1905 to 1909.  Reardon does not, however, provide a detailed look at how these 
reforms changed in practice when they took effect or at how they influenced leaders.  Reardon’s 
argument that there was a shift in military education complements historian James Abraham’s 
synthesis of political, social, industrial, and military changes during the early Progressive Era.   
Abraham shows the parallels between the professionalization of occupations within 
society and the professionalization of the officer corps occurring within the military.15  Whereas 
Reardon’s argument is specific to military reform, Abraham’s argument connects military reform 
to changes within society.  Abraham explains the way in which social reforms from the 
Progressive movement of the late 19th century and professionalization of occupations had a 
direct influence on the U.S. military.  During this period, the Army officer corps sought to 
identify itself as a profession.  Historian Joseph T. Glatthaar stipulates that a “profession is first 
and foremost an identity.  Army officers perceived themselves as professionals, and others 
recognized them as such.”16  How society perceived the officer corps was just as important as the 
officer corps’ perception of itself as a profession.  Furthermore, societal emphasis on applying 
science to everything led to an increase in scientific management, which, especially for military 
officers, entailed planning and defining war’s unknowns and intangibles.   
Historian Antulio J. Echevarria II states that Clausewitz’s On War is an example of the 
use of scientific methods to create awareness of “war’s intangibles.”  Intangibles are crucial to 
 
15 James Abraham, American Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Giant Military Power (New York: Free 
Press, 1981). 
16 Joseph T. Glatthaar, American Military History: A Concise History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 
27. 
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his argument for separating and defining military art and science.  Echevarria then combines art 
and science into the single term “practice.”  Here, instead of using the terms heroic and 
managerial, Echevarria uses the terms “military art” and “military science.”17  He provides the 
same examples to illustrate military practitioners, Patton and MacArthur, and further argues that 
“art is not essential for military success – only for military glory.”   Echevarria’s argument falls 
in line with both Janowitz’s and this thesis’ assertion that the pursuit of honor and glory fall 
within a traditional or “heroic” perspective of military leadership.   
Most historians quickly point out Eisenhower’s ability to foster positive diplomatic 
relations or to understand grand strategy.  Weigley aptly points out Eisenhower’s skill at 
maintaining relations with the allies, stating that Eisenhower was “amiably diplomatic.”  He had 
the “ability to foster friendly Allied teamwork, through a thoroughly internationalized supreme 
headquarters.”  Eisenhower was also viewed favorably by the British due to his “success in 
maintaining Anglo-American harmony” in North Africa and the fact that Eisenhower was less 
traditional than previous American commanders.18  Huntington said much the same: 
“Eisenhower functioned in political and diplomatic roles.”19  Janowitz called Eisenhower the 
“image of a military manager,” someone who “reflected the technical and pragmatic dimensions 
of war-making.”20  Glatthaar and Echevarria II both call upon operational thinking, or 
 
17 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War, U.S. Military Practice from the Revolution to 
Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 47-9. 
18 Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 36. 
19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 322. 
20 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 154. 
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“operational science,” to refer to Eisenhower’s devotion to the planning process, which earned 
him his place in the War Department.21 
Adrian Lewis argues that Eisenhower’s vision of leadership, and the military in general, 
during World War II is different from those of other officers despite their common backgrounds, 
such as West Point, Command and General Staff School, and the Army War College, and their 
common service in World War II.  Lewis argues that “Eisenhower did a disservice to the Army, 
not by his frugal policies, but by his failure to insure [sic] that the Army retained its center and 
fighting spirit.”22  Lewis leaves unrecognized the distinct and different experiences an officer can 
have at each of those institutions.  Experiences varied wildly among Eisenhower, Patton, 
MacArthur, and Bradley.  Lewis also fails to understand the importance of familial background, 
which Janowitz listed as a contributor to a tendency of managerial leadership.   
There are two important points missing from Lewis’s argument.  One, Eisenhower was 
not “peculiar” in the sense of being alone in his style of leadership. Two, Lewis seemingly does 
not understand the transformation that had taken place within Army leadership to create more 
officers like Eisenhower.  This thesis supports Janowitz’s paradigms of heroic and managerial 
leadership and attempts to provide a more detailed practical examination of the transformation 
suggested by Reardon, which took place in the early 20th century.  It is critical to understand that 
practical application does not immediately change just because policy changes.  It takes time for 
those changes to reverberate throughout an organization.   
 
21 Echevarria II, Reconsidering, 110; Glatthaar, American Military History, 76. 
22 Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, 3rd ed. (NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 152. 
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Chapter 1 - The Cause for Managerial Leadership 
In the late 19th century and early 20th century, the U.S. Army changed drastically from a 
force presumably based on heroic leadership to one increasingly shaped by managerial 
organization.  Events such as the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars and individuals such as 
General Emory Upton and Secretary of War Elihu Root were significant in causing and leading 
the change.  Root and other leaders believed that weaknesses uncovered in mobilizing for the 
Spanish-American War and in fighting it proved that Upton had been right when he claimed that 
the U.S. Army needed fundamental reforms.  The inadequacy of management and organization 
compelled Root to enact radical reforms to transform the U.S. Army into a modern organization.  
In this transformation, Root drew inspiration from Upton’s writings, which played a vital role in 
influencing the changes that occurred in the early 20th century.  Eisenhower’s early reflections 
of the military, West Point instruction, and early military career were indirectly affected by the 
ideas of Upton, the failures of the Spanish-American War, and Root’s educational reforms.  
Eisenhower was a product of the transformation of the Army from a heroic fraternity into a 
management-based organization. 
 Problems with a Heroic Army 
In both the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War, the U.S. Army embraced a 
heroic style of leadership.  The Army lacked a system for general staffing, nor were they 
standardized either in equipment or in training.  Moreover, the U.S. did not have a clear 
delineation of authority between the civilian and military control of its armies.  Politicians and 
senior Army officers emphasized courageous and brave leaders, held tradition paramount, and 
believed in the republican system of volunteer militias.  Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt 
exemplified the heroic leadership style.  In his first public address as the Assistant Secretary of 
15 
the Navy in 1897, Roosevelt stated: “No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme 
triumphs of war.”23  Roosevelt was highlighting gallantry in war, and that triumph in war was 
“more manly” than any triumph of peace.  This kind of heroic statement on the “triumphs of 
war” shows Roosevelt’s heroic leadership style.  He put himself forth as a dominating figure, 
reluctant to compromise, which also encouraged perceiving him as a heroic figure.  Further, in 
his descriptions of the battle of San Juan Hill (Kettle Hill), Roosevelt wrote, “when on 
horseback, I could see my men better and they could see me better.”24  His description presumes 
his conscious decision to adhere to a self-prescribed image as a “Rough Rider.” 
The war with Spain highlighted some critical failures in the U.S. military: Coordination 
between the civilian and military leaders, the volunteer system, and planning and organization. 
From the beginning, the mobilization for the Spanish-American War in 1898 by the War 
Department was “abysmally prepared,” as historian Joseph T. Glatthaar puts it.  Commanding 
General Nelson A. Miles and Secretary of War Russell Alger did not synchronize their plans and 
held different visions of the war with Spain.  Secretary Alger called for numerous volunteer 
regiments to immediately embark toward Cuba, while General Miles hoped for a more organized 
campaign later that year.25  The lack of unified decision-making begged the question of who 
commanded troops in the field. 
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Troops in the Army numbered nearly 28,000 regular soldiers and increased with 
volunteer and militia as the war neared, which then grew the Army to over 220,000.26  These 
soldiers were not uniformly trained, nor were either the regular, militia, or the volunteer soldiers 
drilled in movement operations larger than a regiment.27  The Army deployed to Cuba by the 
U.S. was an unorganized mishmash of regular soldiers and citizen soldiers who were unprepared 
and ill-equipped to fight a war.  The embarkation of troops at Tampa was haphazard and poorly 
planned and compounded the problems that plagued soldiers once they landed in Cuba.  The War 
Department failed to provide transports to Cuba; therefore, unreliable private transports were 
contracted.  General Shafter failed to properly prioritize food, ammunition, and medical supplies 
that were loaded, and what supplies were brought were unsystematically piled onto the beach.28   
A traditional leader who had been a Civil War hero, Shafter failed to suitably manage logistics 
for the campaign in Cuba and subsequently suffered many casualties due to illness and exposure.  
In addition, Shafter’s request to Secretary of War Alger to move to better ground was denied, 
further exemplifying the disconnection between the highest levels of both civilian and military 
leadership.29  
Toward the end of the Spanish-American War, rumors carried by the press spread word 
of negligence and incompetence in the War Department and senior military officials.  General 
Nelson Miles and Dr. William Daly, a surgeon, accused War Department officials of criminal 
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negligence by sending “embalmed” canned beef to U.S. soldiers in Cuba.30  McKinley appointed 
General Grenville Dodge as president of the commission charged with investigating these 
allegations of corruption and negligence.  The “Dodge Commission” failed to find any evidence 
of the corruption that General Miles had alleged, and the McKinley administration was able to 
avoid serious damage.31  As a result of this commission Secretary of War Alger was replaced by 
Elihu Root.  Although it cleared the McKinley administration of the specific charges it 
investigated, the Dodge Commission still highlighted the mismanagement of the military during 
the Spanish-American War and its very existence exposed the distrust between its civilian and 
military officials. 
In the war with Spain, the U.S. annexed the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, as well 
as making Cuba a protectorate.32  Concurrent with and following the “splendid little war,” as 
Secretary of State John Hay famously dubbed the fighting with Spain, the U.S. Marines and 
Volunteers were embroiled in a “nasty little war” fighting an insurgency in the Philippines.33  
American perceptions of the war distinctly changed following the “massacre” at Balangiga, 
where villagers attacked the military garrison, killing 36 soldiers and wounding 22.  Historian 
Brian Linn argues that “Balangiga profoundly shocked Americans and touched off an immediate 
outcry for vengeance.”34  This appetite for vengeance gave rise to the cruel and harsh policies of 
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General Jacob Smith, whose orders to his men to “burn and kill” were revealed in a series of 
court-martials in 1902 when stories of the harsh treatment of Filipinos by American soldiers 
broke into public view.  Linn argues that the “trials seem to embody the brutality, ambiguity, and 
frustration of our first Asian guerilla conflict.”35  
Linn is describing a significant defeat of “American Exceptionalism” or the belief that 
God’s will or Providence protects America.  Military victories against Mexico and Spain had 
seemingly reinforced the concept that wars could be won with the militia and volunteers, heroic 
leaders, and without a well-coordinated strategy.  The chaotic mobilization for the war with 
Spain, poor logistical management, the Philippine insurrection, and scandals about alleged 
brutality demonstrated to Secretary of War Elihu Root that changes were needed.  Although 
Elihu Root certainly had the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars to examine their respective 
failings, he was influenced by other theorists such as Spenser Wilkinson, author of The Brain of 
an Army, and General Emory Upton.  In laying the cornerstone for the Army War College in 
1903, Elihu Root said: “Were Upton living today, he would see all of the great reforms for which 
he contended substantially secured.”36  Root looked to Upton for inspiration in driving out some 
of the outdated traditional practices of the Army in favor of a more professionalized officer corps 
and a better organized and better managed method for planning for future conflicts. 
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 General Emory Upton 
General Emory Upton was significant in laying out reforms both in the realm of theory 
and in actual practice that he believed were required to modernize the Army and the officer 
corps.  Upton wanted to eliminate the threat of uneducated, untrained, or popular leaders.  
Instead, his reforms endorsed professional and advanced military education to train leaders who 
would not, in Upton’s mind, lead men to slaughter.  His experiences in the Civil War molded his 
views on military practice and management.  In battle, Upton demonstrated qualities of a heroic 
leader.  Even as a young officer, he had begun to offer practical changes in tactics and 
recognized the importance of professionally educated military leaders.  Heroic, or traditional 
leaders were discontented with Upton’s ideas that laid the seeds for a shift to favoring 
managerial leadership, which influenced future administrations to enact serious restructurings 
within the Army. 
Upton was a progressive military leader, one who was open to new ideas that supplanted 
established traditions. He pushed for an ideological and organizational transformation within the 
U.S. military.  He believed that military leaders should receive new and better military education 
and that the Army required reorganization, including the creation of a better general staff system 
to manage the military more efficiently. Emory Upton was born in 1839, as the tenth of thirteen 
children, in New York.  Before entering the academy at West Point in 1856, Upton attended 
Oberlin College for two years.37  Upton was commissioned in the Army just as the Civil War had 
begun in 1861.  After his first taste of battle on July 21, 1861, at the Battle of Bull Run near 
Blackburn’s Ford, Upton quickly became a battery commander and further distinguished himself 
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during the Peninsula Campaign in 1862.  He also saw battle at Antietam, where he turned back 
several advancing units of Confederate soldiers with his artillery battery.38 
After the Battle of Salem Church and on the eve of the Overland Campaign in early 1864, 
Upton learned lasting critical lessons.  Upton’s time at West Point and his years fighting in the 
Civil War enhanced his disdain for politicians.  Writing to his sister Louisa, Upton said: “Our 
defeats emanate from Washington, for with poor generals the courage of our troops would 
surmount the obstacles the rebels oppose to our march. How I would like to see that general rise 
who would lead us to great deeds.”39  Upton claimed that only through the sheer courage of 
troops could incompetence emanating from Washington be overcome.  Historian David J. 
Fitzpatrick aptly connects these words with reforms later proposed by Upton who sought to limit 
the influence of politicians upon the military.  Another lasting lesson is the importance of 
discipline and training.  Upton recognized the difference between the untrained volunteers at the 
First Battle of Bull Run and the highly trained and disciplined volunteers under his command at 
Salem Church.40 Upton held that trained volunteers were just as good as seasoned regular troops 
and could be just as successful.41 
The last two years of the Civil war experience served to solidify the lessons that Upton 
learned.  Witnessing the high cost of incompetence in war, Upton firmly held that the loss of 
soldiers’ lives could have been significantly reduced.  This idea fueled his passion to reform the 
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Army.42  Upton’s performance at Spotsylvania Court House on May 10, 1864 illustrated how he 
was rethinking not only tactics but also purpose, intent, and follow-on actions.  He wrote that 
“most of our assaults had failed for want of minute instructions, and particularly at the moment 
of success.”43  Upton planned to charge a weak point along the Confederate line of breastworks 
with a heavily reinforced infantry brigade.  Unique to this charge was that troops would not 
pause to fire but would quickly charge with bayonets into the breastworks of the Confederates.  
Speed was key.  If the first units attained a breakthrough, follow-on units would quickly rush 
through the breakthrough to exploit the offensive and overwhelm the Confederates.44  The tactics 
were not unlike those used by August von Mackensen and others during World War I, which 
contributed to blitzkrieg tactics in World War II.  Upton’s assault as a whole failed to achieve the 
success intended.  Senior military leaders failed to support his assault and exploit the 
breakthrough, and Confederate forces were able to quickly reorganize and counterattack Upton’s 
forces, pushing them back to Union lines.45  Upton believed that his senior leaders had failed to 
support his actions, which, he believed, would have been successful with their support.  
Examples such as this led Upton to believe increasingly that inept generals unnecessarily 
increased the war’s devastation and duration.46 
Emory Upton believed that traditional military policies were outdated and left the U.S. 
vulnerable to foreign nations.  Upton reflected on his experiences in the Civil War and he also 
 
42 Fitzpatrick, Emory Upton, 54. 
43 Emory Upton to Adam Badeau, Dec. 26, 1873, Adam Badeau Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in, Fitzpatrick, 
Emory Upton, 59. 
44 Michie, Letters of Emory Upton, 92-100. 
45 Fitzpatrick, Emory Upton, 60-1. 
46 Fitzpatrick, Emory Upton, 83. 
22 
conducted a seventeen-month long review of the armies in Asia and Europe.  Then he compared 
the armed forces of those other nations with those of the United States.  He argued that military 
reforms were required to strengthen the Regular Army, and so was a redesigned general staff 
system based on the Prussian model, thus eliminating several inefficiencies within the American 
design.  Upton observed the lack of advanced military schooling for military officers, the 
inadequacy of staff support for general officers, and a failure to cycle field and staff positions. 
Upton also criticized the citizen-soldier system, arguing that it fostered an antiquated system that 
would not stand up to a formable foe.  However, he believed that the training at West Point was 
superior to any in Europe.47  As noted earlier, Upton was critical of the Civil War-era volunteer 
system but not the volunteer soldiers themselves.  Upton believed that through training and 
discipline volunteer soldiers were just as formidable as any other soldiers. 
 Upton listed the causes of the U.S. Army’s weakness in the introduction to his 
posthumously published The Military Policy of the United States. Upton cited undisciplined 
troops, short enlistments, politicians’ intrusion into military affairs, and failure of military 
education, to name a few.48  Short enlistments, as Upton experienced during the Civil War, left 
little to no time for training, which inevitably led to higher casualties, something he wanted to 
avoid.49  Upton saw warfare as the business of military professionals and believed that intrusion 
by politicians caused inefficiencies and miscommunication and that it would lead to the deaths of 
more troops.  In his published and unpublished works, Upton highlighted several instances where 
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political machinations negatively intervened in military affairs.  He directly attributed volunteer 
units’ lack of preparedness to Congressional incompetence.  He added that “it is important to 
bear in mind the respective duties and responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen.”50  There is no 
doubt that Upton would have viewed the chaotic mobilization for the Spanish-American War in 
the same light.  Upton saw the U.S. military as lagging behind its European counterparts in 
postgraduate education, where senior officers can continue their military education in strategic 
theory and sciences.  This gap in education led to generals’ inability to manage properly the 
logistics of large armies.51 
Upton’s reforms fell into two broad categories: technical military reforms, such as those 
pertaining to the general staff and to mandatory retirement age, and the other category, which 
required new legislation such as a new militia or volunteer act.  According to historian Richard 
C. Brown, Upton argued for “interchangeable appointments between staff and line” positions and 
compulsory retirement for old generals who, he believed, would resist reform.52  Upton argued 
that, in order to make a dynamic transformation, the traditional generals had to be pushed out to 
allow room for younger, more progressive generals.  The bias in favor of younger generals 
anticipates what General George C. Marshall did later in selecting men such as Eisenhower to be 
generals.   
Upton’s proposed system would have expanded the Regular Army, created an army of 
National Volunteers commanded and supported by the Federal Government, and retained the 
 
50 Upton, Military Policy, 304-5. 
51 Michie, Letters of Emory Upton, 418-9. 
52 Richard C. Brown, “General Emory Upton – The Army's Mahan,” Military Affairs 17, no. 3 (Autumn, 1953), 127-
8. 
24 
militia supported exclusively by the states.53  The National Volunteers would have worked much 
like the modern National Guard.  The National Volunteers were organized locally and would 
train regularly following a standardized federal curriculum, and its officers would have received 
the same military education as regular officers.  Upton hoped that this would allow the U.S. 
military to expand quickly with trained troops while recognizing the importance and symbology 
of a “volunteer” force.54  Though not copied directly, Upton’s concept for reforming the Militia 
Act of 1792 inspired Secretary of War Elihu Root to reform and standardize the militia or 
National Guard. 
 
 Root Reforms 
Secretary of War Elihu Root sponsored the reforms that changed the U.S. Army from a 
heroic fraternity to a management-based institution.55  His reforms greatly emphasized education 
for officers and directly influenced the type of military education that Eisenhower received at 
West Point and later in postgraduate schools.  Significantly influenced by Upton, Root sought to 
“fix” the major concerns laid out by Upton in his posthumously published The Military Policy of 
the United States.  Root perceived the administrative failings during the Spanish-American War 
and connected the causes of failure with the concerns laid forth by Upton.  On the reform of 
military education and rethinking concepts of leadership, historian Russel Weigley argued that a 
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significant difficulty for Elihu Root was a conceptual “transition from ‘heroic leadership’ to the 
‘managerial’ concept of military command.”56  In other words, Root’s transformation of the 
military was shaped by a need for an ideological shift. 
Root became Secretary of War in 1899 and laid the groundwork for significant reform of 
the U.S. military in organization, training and education, and officer development.  Following the 
inadequacies of Secretary of War Alger and the chaotic mobilization during the Spanish-
American War, Secretary Root reorganized the War Department which better defined its 
relationship to the armed forces.  Root was heavily influenced by Upton’s The Armies of Asia 
and Europe, his personal writings and letters, and the unfinished The Military Policy of the 
United States, as well as by the Dodge Commission and by Spenser Wilkinson’s The Brain of an 
Army.  Providing a British perspective on the German general staff system, Wilkinson argued 
that the general staff was the brain of the German Army.  The general staff is the cornerstone of 
the Army’s organization.  The general staff plans for war, increases the efficiency of the Army, 
and acts as a training academy and institution for learning with each of these functions formed 
under a Chief of Staff.  Secretary Root’s significant contributions toward military reform 
included the Militia Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act after Congressman Charles Dick, 
the 1903 General Staff Act, and the establishment of the Army War College in 1903.57  These 
three major reforms enacted in 1903 spoke to some of the gravest problems that Emory Upton 
had pointed out.  There were other reforms sponsored by Secretary Root, such as enlarging the 
academy at West Point or inspired later reforms, such as the National Defense Act of 1933, 
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which officially established the National Guard as a reserve component in the U.S.  The reforms 
of 1903 set in motion a dynamic transformation from a traditional military towards a modern 
professionalized military.   
In an address during West Point’s centennial in 1902, Root spoke about the type of 
leaders then needed. “Armies are large,” he said, “and the problems of supply, of transportation, 
have become complicated and difficult, requiring the best art of the best-trained minds.”  He 
further suggested that an “increase in the scientific qualities of attack and defense” made it 
essential to have leaders who can understand these complexities.58  Speaking at the cornerstone 
laying of the Army War College in Washington, D.C. Root stated: 
The officer who keeps his mind alert by intellectual exercise, and who 
systematically studies the reasons of action, and the materials and 
conditions and difficulties with which he may have to deal, will be the 
stronger practical man and the better solider.59 
As part of several educational reforms and reorganizations, Root placed a significant 
emphasis on postgraduate education.  On numerous occasions, he noted the changing military 
complexities in war.  He understood that a drastic transformation favoring a managerial style of 
leader was required to ensure that the military would be able to manage new complex problems 
in war.  With the emphasis on higher military education, Root intended to force a transformation 
from the traditional Army to a managerial army. 
The Militia Act of 1903 set forth new regulations for transforming the militia into the 
National Guard.  The lack of discipline in volunteer units and their inability to defeat “savages” 
in the Philippines were taken as proof of the need to federalize the training of the state militias, 
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enacted as part of the 1903 Militia “Dick” Act.  This act standardized training and equipment, 
which in many cases was antiquated, such as the use of muskets at a time when manufactured 
repeating rifles existed.60  The Dick Act required that all National Guard units conform to all the 
rules and regulations that governed the Regular Army.  When under the authority of the United 
States, the National Guard was “subject to the same Rules and Articles of War as the regular 
troops.”61  The former militias were required to conform to the standard of uniform, equipment, 
arms, and practices of the Regular Army and would be compensated for this massive 
undertaking.  One of the biggest benefits from the Militia Act of 1903 was that pay and 
entitlements matched those of the Regular Army.  In addition, National Guard officers received 
the same education and opportunities as Regular Army officers.62 
Not since the Militia Act of 1792 had the United States modified the way its services 
would be organized, how they were trained and interacted, and what they could be called upon to 
do in a time of war.  The Militia Act of 1903 seemingly solved several problems presented by 
Emory Upton.  The Dick Act standardized the militia into a National Guard, federalized its 
training, and afforded officers expanded military education.  However, the Dick Act had 
limitations, such as allowing enlistments in the National Guard to be as short as nine months and 
letting the states keep control of appointing officers in the National Guard.  Further reforms, such 
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as the Militia Act of 1908 and the National Defense Act of 1933, fixed many of these 
problems.63  
Root held Emory Upton in high regard, and Upton’s writing greatly influenced Root and 
many of his reforms.  Root himself compared his reforms to those proposed by Upton.  In the 
speech he gave at the cornerstone laying of the Army War College, Root stated, “Were Upton 
living today, still upon the active list of the Army, he would see all of the great reforms for 
which he contended substantially secured.”64  Emory Upton would not have agreed with 
everything Root did. For example, Upton would have had mixed feelings about the General Staff 
Act of 1903, which created the Chief of Staff, allowed for a general staff corps of 44 officers, 
and decreed that the Chief of Staff “shall have supervision of all troops of the line.”65  The 
specific act giving the Chief of Staff authority over field armies would most certainly have 
pleased Upton, because he strongly disliked civilian intrusion into management of the Army.  
Russell Weigley argues that Secretary Root applied private business practices to the military.  
For example, Root stated:  
Economical and business principles seem to justify the bringing together of 
these bureaus under a single chief, who will have general direction of all and 
who will be able to decide promptly and on business principles what shall be 
done by each particular bureau in the mobilization and concentration of 
troops.66   
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Root clearly understood progressive reform in the civilian realm, and applied it to military 
organization.  Upton also would have applauded temporary service and term limits for officers 
on the general staff.  Secretary Root, in the General Staff Act of 1903, clearly placed the 
Secretary of War position within the chain of command, placing the Chief of Staff between 
himself and the field armies.  However, to Root’s chagrin, and surely Upton’s as well, Secretary 
Root was unable to place all the military bureaus under the direction of the Chief of Staff, such 
as logistics.67  The general staff would create plans for mobilization and various other 
contingency plans, which served to promote bureaucracy and management within the Army.  As 
Root insisted, “the General Staff must not ‘operate.’ It must instead ‘supervise.’”68 
The establishment of the Army War College in 1903, expansion of the United States 
Military Academy at West Point, and later the founding of the Army Industrial College all served 
to modernize and professionalize the officer corps.  Upton had argued that Army leaders’ 
incompetence had led to unnecessary deaths during the Civil War and had urged the Army to 
create postgraduate military education for all Army officers.69  Just as American society during 
the Progressive Era sought to create rational order and encouraged science, Root intended that 
military education drew on a new emphasis on the science of management.70  
The era of Root’s reforms led to a conflicting dynamic in the Army, where senior leaders 
still had a significant influence on the education of junior officers and on the direction of the 
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U.S. Army in general.  The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars touched the lives of many 
throughout the country, and, certainly, this was true of those who were related to or knew the 
volunteers of Funston’s 20th Kansas Volunteers.  Society viewed the military in heroic terms and 
would continue doing so Throughout the extended process of implementing the Root Reforms.71  
Eisenhower’s, and society’s, opinion of the military was affected by the military’s actions during 
the Philippine War through the opinions of those around him.  However, the beliefs of his mother 
had the most significant impact on his initial impressions of the military. 72 
 
 Eisenhower in Abilene, Kansas 
Eisenhower’s rural upbringing inclined him to accept and then to favor cooperation and 
to develop raw managerial skills and attributes uniquely suited for managerial leadership.  This 
background as a “farm kid” certainly set him apart from the likes of those like George Patton, 
who graduated earlier in 1909, whose family history was full of exemplary military service.73  
His background is similar to classmate Omar Bradley, who was also born into a working family 
and later became an influential managerial leader.74   
Dwight D. Eisenhower was born on October 14, 1890, in Denison, Texas into a family 
descended from 18th-century German immigrants who soon moved to Abilene, Kansas.  
Dwight’s father, David, worked in the Belle Springs Creamery in Abilene as a maintenance 
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engineer.  The owner was part of the “River Brethren” community that had included 
Eisenhower’s ancestors when they lived in Pennsylvania.  Dwight’s mother, Ida, stayed at home 
to raise the growing the family and used a vast array of home remedies to heal the many minor 
injuries occasioned by fights between Dwight and his brothers.75  From a young age, Eisenhower 
was said to have had a terrible temper, which only served to exacerbate the rivalry that existed 
between Dwight and his older brother Edgar.  This temper, exacerbated from frustration or 
passion, could have swayed Eisenhower toward heroic leadership.  Being overtly passionate or 
showy are traits of heroic leadership.  Instead, this rivalry served to push both boys to continually 
strive to outperform each other in every way, but especially in sports.76  He made use of his 
passion and competitiveness to make himself better, not just to look better. 
The two brothers also received the most oppressive hand of punishment from their father, 
especially for any infractions affecting the family’s reputation, threatened their education, and 
finances.  Edgar and Dwight learned hard lessons about family and, in particular, about not 
putting the family in jeopardy.77  Edgar Eisenhower later noted that one of the most important 
lessons that each Eisenhower brother learned was the value of hard work and determination.  He 
stated: “There was bred into us a certain independence and a determination to rise above our 
humble beginnings and try to someday amount to something.”78  These statements are not to be 
confused with those of personal valor, which is a heroic trait.  Statements of “independence,” 
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“determination,” or “humble beginnings” reinforce Janowitz’s argument that those from humbler 
beginnings are independent or more creative in their thought processes, which generally imbues 
them with a managerial style of leadership.  For example, MacArthur was raised in the shadow 
of his father, striving to live up to the family name.  Instead of learning independent or out-of-
the-box thinking, he followed the path of his father into military service and the path of heroic 
leadership.  The emphasis placed on pragmatic decisions, those which are thought through 
logically and not passionately, is indicative of managerial traits.  Eisenhower’s father was not 
imbuing his sons with false pride, but rather the pride in working as a family, or team. 
One of Dwight Eisenhower’s earliest mentors was a local man named Bob Davis, who 
was a fisherman, hunter, and guide.  Besides teaching young Eisenhower several skills in 
camping, hunting, and campfire cooking, Davis taught Eisenhower the art of poker.  Davis taught 
Eisenhower the game and the concept of percentages and calculated chance.  Eisenhower 
recalled that Davis “dinned percentages into my head night after night.”79  According to 
Eisenhower, this was his first significant lesson in odds and working with numbers, which 
provided him with an early sense of calculation and its practical uses, not to mention extra 
money from regularly winning poker games as a young man and junior officer.80 
In school, his favorite subjects were arithmetic and grammar.  Grammar helped him to 
speak eloquently during conversations, and arithmetic covered odds and chance.  These two 
subjects combined when he played poker, which also gave him practice in these two subjects.  
Eisenhower’s logical mind enjoyed the lack of ambiguity that existed in arithmetic and grammar.  
His and the community of Abilene’s insistence on practical knowledge was a part of their 
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personalities.81  Abilene was quiet, isolated politically, and conservative, and it fostered a tight-
knit sense of community.  The high school was collocated with the city hall, and students also 
served as volunteer firefighters in the event of an emergency.82  Abilene did not offer as many 
opportunities that could be found in a city, but Eisenhower continued to strengthen his skills in 
arithmetic, grammar, and work ethic.  In high school, Eisenhower was very popular, though he 
had little time for socializing due to his after-school work schedule.  Dwight had laid out his 
priorities, which included sports, work, hunting, and his studies.  The girls liked him for his 
“seemingly carefree personality,” but he described himself as “gangly and awkward, with few of 
the social graces.”83  Eisenhower did not have the fair or showmanship associated with a heroic 
leader.  A carefree or independent attitude is more comparable to managerial leadership than 
heroic leadership.  A few years after World War II ended, Charles Harger, an editor of the 
Abilene Daily-Reflector, described Eisenhower as “a natural leader. He organized groups and 
was popular with teachers….and [was] a healthy boy with a serious mind.”84  He did not hold in 
respect those teachers whom he deemed incompetent, asking questions designed to embarrass 
them.  In addition to the skill of identifying weaknesses and strengths in people, Eisenhower also 
acquired the ability to remember detailed information after hearing it the first time.85   The kind 
of education that Eisenhower got strengthened in him traits that would support a managerial style 
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of leadership, which, once refined in the Army, gave Eisenhower an edge at understanding many 
intricacies in military planning. 
Shortly after high school, a friend and mentor of Eisenhower, Joseph W. Howe, was 
impressed by his mind.   Howe was an editor for the Dickinson County News and gave 
Eisenhower unfettered access to a trove of papers, works, and books.  Howe also provided 
Eisenhower with one of his earliest opportunities to speak in public at a Democratic Party 
meeting at the local pool house, or country club.  Howe certainly encouraged Eisenhower to seek 
his future outside of Abilene, KS, and Eisenhower’s friend Everett E. “Swede” Hazlett certainly 
sealed the deal.  Eisenhower’s friend Swede had initially sought an appointment to West Point to 
pursue his genuine interest in the cavalry; but he was given an appointment to Annapolis instead, 
due to his father’s intervention without consulting Swede.  While back in Abilene to study for a 
reassessment after failing the entry examination, Swede Hazlett urged Eisenhower to seek an 
appointment to Annapolis as well.86 
Utilizing his likable personality, or perhaps manipulation and natural grasp of diplomacy, 
Eisenhower was able to acquire several recommendations and sponsorship from both Democratic 
and Republican politicians, civic leaders, and businessmen in the area.  After having sent Senator 
Joseph L. Bristow two separate letters, Eisenhower was afforded the opportunity to compete for 
one of Senator Bristow’s nominations.87  Eisenhower finished second overall by a close margin 
and received the appointment to West Point only because Senator Bristow sought out 
recommendations from his friend Phil Heath, who placed Eisenhower as the first choice.  Dwight 
traveled to Jefferson Barracks, MO, to complete his four-day entrance examination to West 
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Point.  By chance, another poor young man from rural Missouri also traveled to Jefferson 
Barracks to take the entrance examination.  That man was Omar Bradley.88 
Swede and Dwight studied intensely for the examinations, in much the same way that 
Eisenhower would study with his friend Leonard T. Gerow on that upper-floor barracks room at 
night while attending Command and General Staff School.  His quick mind and strong memory 
served him well, and he recalled the questions and answers he had studied with Swede.  It helps 
to point out the importance of Eisenhower’s modest background that the Army required new 
cadets to pay for their first clothing issue and transportation costs.  Eisenhower arrived at West 
Point with five dollars to his name.89  This illustrates a clash within the West Point admittance 
program between those who came from an upper or middle-class background, favored by the 
traditional Army, and those of lesser means such as Eisenhower or Bradley.  An unreasonable 
burden was placed on Eisenhower, which reflected the nature of the Army at that time.  This was 
the first of many clashes Eisenhower had during his time at West Point as a young leader with 
raw managerial skill, placed within a very traditional training curriculum where he questioned 
and defied several rules and regulations. 
 
 
 
  
 
88 D’Este, Eisenhower, 56-58. 
89 Eisenhower, At Ease, 108. 
36 
Chapter 2 - The Service and Education of a Managerial Leader 
Eisenhower’s education at various Army service schools and his time served under 
influential and intelligent generals distinctly refined his organizational skills and placed him on a 
stable path toward managerial leadership.  Eisenhower’s early career and time at West Point 
showed that he did not fit into the model of an ideal army officer that was widely held in the 
early twentieth century.  Not until he served as a camp commander during World War I, where 
his raw managerial skill was put to the test, did Eisenhower demonstrate his superior qualities in 
administration.  The period between 1922 and 1939 saw tremendous growth and refinement of 
Eisenhower’s managerial skill.  His time at the Command and General Staff School was a 
watershed moment from which he emerged with an understanding of the critical nature of 
management without which the most dramatic postures were useless at best.  This accounted for 
his most significant divergence from heroic leadership and from those who followed that line of 
thinking, such as Patton or MacArthur.  His time serving under generals Conner, Pershing, 
Mosley, and MacArthur provided critical experience, training, and education that solidified his 
career as a managerial leader. 
 
 Eisenhower at West Point 
Eisenhower’s time at West Point provided vital experience which shaped his career by 
reinforcing managerial traits, such as coaching, team building, and innovative thinking.  This is 
not to suggest that heroic leaders cannot coach but that heroic leaders are more likely to be 
dominative, which does not promote an atmosphere suitable for coaching or team building.  
While at West Point, Eisenhower scoffed at tradition and took every opportunity at “bedeviling 
super-serious upperclassmen in their attempts to make us over.”  In other words, he fought back 
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when upper-classmen attempted to haze them.  In one instance, Eisenhower and a friend were 
ordered to report in “full-dress coats,” which meant to report in the cadet dress uniform with long 
tails in the back.  They decided to report wearing only those dress coats and nothing else.  In 
another example, Eisenhower danced in a taboo manner with the daughter of a West Point 
professor.  Getting a rise out of upper-classmen and flirting with a professor’s daughter are just 
two examples of the way in which Eisenhower pushed the boundaries of tradition and regulation, 
which is representative of managerial leadership.  After a second infraction, he was demoted in 
cadet rank, was assigned extra duty, and was confined to his barracks when not at the gym or in 
class.90  His list of demerits went on, and at the end of his cadet years, he ranked 61 of 164 
overall in his graduating class but 125th in discipline.91  Concerning discipline, Lieutenant 
Colonel Morton F. Smith, the Commandant of Cadets at West Point, recommended that 
Eisenhower “should be assigned to [an] organization under [a] strict commanding officer.”92  His 
chafing at tradition and regulations and his average overall ranking suggest that Eisenhower was 
not what most more senior leaders in the Army were looking for in a junior officer; the Army 
expected discipline and strict adherence to regulations. 
In a testament to Eisenhower’s disdain for tradition and hazing, one particular altercation 
especially showed him apart from a traditional leadership style.  Early in his second year, a first-
year cadet, or “plebe,” ran into Eisenhower, sending the plebe onto the ground.  Eisenhower 
responded “with a bellow of astonishment and mock indignation.”  He continued to ask what the 
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plebe’s previous condition of servitude was and stated to the plebe, “You look like a barber.”  
The plebe was, in fact, a barber from the Midwest, having a background similar to Eisenhower’s.  
Eisenhower recalled that he had “managed to make a man ashamed of the work he did to earn a 
living.” From that point on, for the remaining three years at West Point, Eisenhower did not haze 
another plebe.  Eisenhower diverged from the traditional stance, usually held core to heroic 
leadership qualities.  As his reaction to hazing showed, Eisenhower’s background of hard-work 
living had already swayed Eisenhower against the tradition.  Within the seniority system and 
with authority to haze, Eisenhower chose to follow another path illustrating the clash between 
heroic leadership and managerial leadership philosophies.93 
Eisenhower had a passion for sports, especially football, and seemingly he was set for his 
time at West Point.  His years of scrapping with his older brother Edgar had properly toughened 
him up for the rigors he would face as a light running back and linebacker. Eisenhower worked 
hard to gain more muscle mass and to impress the coaches to attain a spot on the varsity team.  
Eisenhower later claimed that “in no game or practice session could the coaches claim that I 
lacked pugnacity and combativeness.”94  He followed the same work ethic he had when studying 
for examinations and quickly earned himself a reputation on the field for his “love for hard 
bodily contact.”95 
An unfortunate injury on the playing field and subsequent further injury during 
horsemanship “monkey drill” landed him in a cast and ended his ability to do anything entailing 
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hard contact, and it nearly ended his military career.96  In a game against Tufts University, a 
week before the Army-Navy game, Eisenhower had suffered a knee sprain that landed him in the 
hospital for a couple of days.  He had been plunging through the line, attempting to break 
through when he became twisted up after being tackled at his lower leg.  After discharge from 
the hospital, Eisenhower went straight back to his regular routine, which included horseback 
riding.  Attempting to vault over his horse as it leaped over a low hurdle caused intense pain to 
his knee, and he fell to the ground.  Eisenhower later said that the “doctors spent four days 
straightening my leg, a process so painful that I scarcely slept during the ordeal.”97  The incident 
ended his sports career, ended his chances to join the cavalry, and nearly cost him his career in 
the military.   
His knee injury proved pivotal in Eisenhower’s life.  The injury forced him away from 
focusing on his own performance in sports and left him with more time for academics, 
meanwhile fostering a different approach toward leadership that depended less on an impression 
of his own excellence.  Following his recuperation, two instances gave evidence that Eisenhower 
was best suited for managerial leadership.  In one instance, utterly unprepared for a mathematics 
problem, Eisenhower came up with a shorter, more logical conclusion than the instructor, who 
then accused Eisenhower of cheating.  Eisenhower, later acquitted of those charges, was 
applauded the instructor’s supervisor for his innovativeness, and his answer incorporated into the 
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curriculum.98  It is critical to point out that his overall ranking of 61 out of 164 is misleading.  
Clearly, Eisenhower possessed a raw talent for understanding problems, but his resistance to 
traditional methods at West Point held him back. 
Eisenhower’s different but correct answer also illustrates a clash between the strictly 
traditional approach taken by West Point and originality.  Eisenhower’s natural affinity for 
numbers, which went back to his time learning poker with Bob Davis, enabled him to rethink the 
problem to come up with another solution.  This is evidence of managerial leadership philosophy 
which sought logic and simplicity and could view problems from a different perspective. 
In the second instance, as part of his post-injury transformation, Eisenhower took up 
coaching football.  He did so well at coaching the junior varsity team that people started 
attending both practices and games of the junior team.99  He had an unusual skill at identifying 
the strengths and weaknesses of his team, and he had a personality that could inspire anyone to 
work harder.  While assessing the strengths and weaknesses of subordinates is not specific to 
managerial leadership, it compliments more managerial leadership traits, like team-building, 
training, and diplomacy.  Eisenhower also took up the role of head cheerleader in his senior year, 
leading pep rallies and getting every cadet excited for the game the next day.  Being a pep-rally 
leader served as practice for speaking effectively in public and for learning how to inspire 
others.100 
His inspirational personality is an early example of Eisenhower showing the leadership 
trait of team-building, inducing others to “buy-in” to the project at hand.  In building a team, or a 
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staff, Eisenhower was less authoritarian (a heroic trait) and chose to pull ideas and strengths from 
within his team.  Eisenhower’s friendly manner and leadership within his group of friends 
offered several chances for Eisenhower to exercise the art of persuasion, or in other words, 
manipulation.101  In two early instances, while at West Point, Eisenhower protected his friends 
from earning a demerit.  In the first instance, a classmate held in confinement was attempting to 
escape for a night of fun.  Because the classmate was a starting football player, Eisenhower took 
it upon himself to convince his classmate to stay in confinement and not jeopardize his standing 
with the football team.  In another occasion, Eisenhower occupied the time of an instructor long 
enough for the bugle to call an end to class.  He had done this when he realized that a classmate 
was struggling with an equation written on the board.  Eisenhower had saved his friend from 
both a demerit and humiliation.102  The sense of “we” or team means that everyone has a stake in 
the overall success of the mission, whether it is a football match or something of larger 
consequence.  The importance of a break from dominative leadership is that it makes more 
feasible the use of a more collaborative style of leadership, which is a significant identifier of 
managerial leadership philosophy.  Eisenhower, in his assessments of the planning for Operation 
Overlord, consistently referred to his staff as his team and offered the pronoun “we” when 
describing actions taken and decisions made.  What he learned as a coach served to refine and 
expand his abilities as a manager of men and training.  Throughout his early career, Eisenhower 
served as the football coach at nearly every unit he joined because of his ability to organize and 
train.   
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 Before Camp Colt 
As a young Lieutenant and then junior Captain, Eisenhower was a promising managerial 
leader caught in a transformation of the dynamics of leadership within the Army.  The Root 
reforms set in motion an emphasis on officer education and professionalization, but it had yet to 
filter its way down to the line units where Eisenhower was first assigned.  The efficiency reports 
Eisenhower’s superiors filed about him from 1915 through 1918 rated Eisenhower as an average 
or unremarkable infantry officer.  The traits and performance evaluated by his commanders were 
geared toward rewarding self-oriented characteristics, such as marksmanship, athleticism, 
bearing, and military appearance.  As an officer with raw managerial talent, Eisenhower’s skills 
were consequently overlooked during this period. 
His evaluations before commanding at Camp Colt (1915-1917) were all written after 
1917.  They talked very generically about Eisenhower’s skills, and they suggested that 
Eisenhower was undistinguished.103  The late date and generic phrasing of Eisenhower’s reports 
could be indicative of the evaluator not remembering Eisenhower’s performance, or not caring 
about Eisenhower’s early service records.  Both of these observations are indicative of 
Eisenhower being unmemorable.  Surely, if Eisenhower’s service had been superior, a 
commanding officer would have remembered his excellent actions, even years after the fact.  
That is to say, Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur’s reports as a platoon leader in the Philippines, as 
an aide-de-camp to his father, General Arthur MacArthur, Jr., or as aide-de-camp to President 
 
103 It is not entirely clear when these summary reports were taken.  It is fair to assume that they were written at the 
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Theodore Roosevelt most certainly were not generic.  His summary reports from 1915 through 
1917 contain repeated phrases, such as “is qualified mentally and morally and is fitted physically 
for all the duties of his position.”104  This is repeated on five separate occasions by five different 
commanders.  Eisenhower’s first company commander, Captain George W. Helms, rated his 
military appearance as “very good” and physical fitness as “excellent.”  Helms concluded that 
Eisenhower is “an able man, and when he has had sufficient experience will be an excellent 
officer.”105  By Helms’s standards, which favored heroic leadership, Eisenhower was an able, 
though unexceptional, officer. 
 His next report was also written by Helms, now a major and a battalion commander.  
Major Helms repeated his previous comments on appearance and fitness, and he added that 
Eisenhower was “active and able” and that Eisenhower “needs more experience.”  In that same 
report, a divisional inspector, Major Arthur S. Conklin, also concluded that Eisenhower is 
“active and able” and that he “needs more experience.”106  If an officer is outstanding or 
exceptional, a commander would remember such an officer and have little trouble in writing a 
unique report.  Whereas, if an officer is underwhelming, a commander may find themselves at a 
loss for words and may lazily “copy and paste” to add filler in an evaluation.  The previous two 
examples illustrate the fact that the summaries are probably administrative filler.  For lack of a 
refined assessment, the evaluators chose to copy the previous report, and are indicative that 
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Eisenhower was not an officer who stood out.  Based on their evaluation criteria, Eisenhower fell 
short of exceptional or superior officer quality. 
 Captain Eisenhower’s last two evaluations before commanding at Camp Colt were 
written on the Department of Army’s Form Number 706, and the rating periods extended from 
after the U.S. entered World War I to a time before his command at Camp Colt, Pennsylvania.  
These evaluations best illustrate the discrepancies with rating period and dates, and they further 
show that Eisenhower was unremarkable when viewed through evaluation criteria determined by 
the Army, which favored heroic leadership.  The rating period covered on the first form is from 
September 22, 1917 to November 26, 1917and it was initiated on January 7, 1920 and signed on 
January 23, 1920.  The second evaluation covers the period from December 15, 1917 to March 1, 
1918, and it was completed prior to the first form.  Viewing Eisenhower through the Army’s 
formulated evaluation criteria, he was evaluated on physical energy, common sense, attention to 
duty, initiative, organizing ability, and capacity for command which was dictated by the Form 
706.  Eisenhower was rated “average” on all accounts, except for physical energy, which was 
rated “above average” on one form.107  Based on the Army’s subjective criteria, Eisenhower was 
evaluated as average.  More importantly, is the lack of detail or description of Eisenhower’s 
abilities in the “comments” section of the form.  The discrepancies in dates and bureaucratic 
filler point to the fact that these commanders were likely too busy and did not believe these 
evaluations required extra consideration. 
Eisenhower’s superiors were forced to view him through the formulaic criteria provided 
by the Army and likely never afforded him the opportunity to demonstrate his organizational 
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skills, an opportunity that Camp Colt afforded him.  The introduction of new efficiency reports 
in 1919 showed that the military was going through administrative changes in an effort to 
bureaucratize, a continuation of the Root reforms.  The fact that the evaluation criteria were all 
based on traditional traits illustrates the way that senior Army leaders still held tradition in higher 
regard.  However, a structured form, which attempted to objectify officer qualities, showed an 
openness to management innovations. 
 
 Camp Colt 
Captain Eisenhower’s raw managerial skill in training, organizing, and coaching men 
allowed Eisenhower to distinguish himself for the first time while in command of Camp Colt, 
PA.  He was tasked to train tank crews deploying to France to fight under General Pershing 
during World War I.  As part of tank crew training, Eisenhower helped develop methods for 
training individuals and small units with whatever equipment happened to be on hand.  He was 
forced to think outside the box to make efficient use of time soldiers spent on maneuvers and 
tactics.   Eisenhower’s efficiency report while in command of Camp Colt provided the first 
glimpse at his managerial skill.  In addition, even though Captain Eisenhower held a position 
usually held by a brigadier general, he struggled to receive brevet promotion to major even as 
officers junior to him were promoted.  Though he would eventual earn a brevet promotion to 
Major in June 1918, and then to brevet Lieutenant Colonel in October 1918.108  Years later, on 
the day on which German forces in the Ruhr Valley surrendered (April 18, 1945), Eisenhower 
wrote to his friend Edward “Swede” Hazlett that appropriate rank should be given to those in 
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positions of higher responsibility.109  During World War I, although reformers were pushing 
managerial leadership, in practice, preference was still placed on honor, glory, gallantry, and 
heroic leadership, which was demonstrated on the field of battle, not on the home front. 
Captain Eisenhower’s efficiency reports for his time in service at Camp Colt, from March 
to November 1918, at Fort Benning, GA, from December 1918 to March 1919, and at Camp 
Meade, MD, from March to July 1919 demonstrate increased leadership performance.  These 
reports were written in July 1919 by Colonel I. C. Welborn, Colonel H. E. Eames, and Colonel 
W. H. Clopton, respectively, while Eisenhower was a part of the 1919 Motor Transport Corps 
convoy.110   
The reports from late 1918 to 1919 list Eisenhower as above average and superior.111  As 
listed in the performance section of the Form No. 706 for his time as commander of Camp Colt, 
Eisenhower was evaluated by Colonel Welborn as “superior” at attention-to-duty, initiative, and 
capacity for command.  Eisenhower was graded as above average in the remaining three 
categories. The most telling comment, which is from Welborn, states that Eisenhower was “one 
of the most efficient young officers I have known” and that the duties and responsibilities of his 
position were those of a brigadier general.112  There is a significant change in Eisenhower’s 
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written evaluation from his previous assessments, where he was given “average” ratings and 
generic comments from his commanders to his “superior” performance while organizing and 
training men.  The achievement is not that he held the duties of a brigadier general while a 
captain; it is that he performed these responsibilities well and above the expectations of an 
officer in his rank.  Following World War I, Eisenhower reverted back to his regular rank of 
captain and would be promoted back to major for the second time in July 1920. 
In addition to this excellent evaluation, Colonel Welborn recommended brevet Lieutenant 
Colonel Eisenhower for the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM) for his outstanding service 
during his command of Camp Colt during World War I.  It is important to note the difference 
between the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM).  
The DSC is awarded for actions of gallantry against enemy forces, whereas, the DSM is awarded 
for exceptionally meritorious service in positions of extreme importance, such as chiefs of staff, 
general ranks, and commanders within the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).  During and 
immediately following World War I, most DSMs were awarded to higher ranking chiefs of staff 
or commanders within the AEF.  Eisenhower was initially recommended for the DSM by Major 
R. B. Harrison, who stated that Eisenhower demonstrated “unusually good judgment and rare 
ability” and “overcame all obstacles and difficulties and thereby enabled the Tank Corps to keep 
entirely up with the shipping schedule, despite the Flu epidemic.”113  In April 1920, Colonel 
Welborn followed up on the Recommendation that Eisenhower be awarded the DSM by 
reiterating that the “services of Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower were invaluable to the Tank 
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Corps and indispensable, so much so that he was not allowed to go overseas as he desired.”114  
Major General Henry Jervey, then the Assistant to the Chief of Staff, replied on April 21, 1920, 
who judged that Eisenhower’s work did not justify the DSM for service at Camp Colt.115 
Because Eisenhower’s service as camp commander was outside of combat and not of 
extreme importance, the recommendation was disapproved.  Jervey “determined that the services 
performed by this officer, while efficient, are not exceptionally meritorious services to the 
Government, performed in a duty of great responsibility.”116  One year later, in April 1921, 
Colonel Welborn petitioned the Army Adjutant General to reconsider the recommendation of the 
DSM to Eisenhower.  Welborn wrote: “From the beginning of the organization of the Tank 
Corps to the signing of the armistice, Major Eisenhower performed with marked ability duties of 
great responsibility.”  He also noted Eisenhower’s “zeal and marked administrative ability.”117  
Significantly, Welborn’s recommendation for the DSM emphasized Eisenhower’s managerial 
skill, such as organization, training, and administrative ability.  Welborn invoked managerial 
leadership attributes in contrast to heroic leadership attributes in his recommendation for 
Eisenhower. This, as well as the fact that Eisenhower was not in a position of extreme 
importance, hurt his chances to receive the DSM, but Welborn’s use of managerial leadership 
characteristics marked an ongoing transition within the officer corps that eventually allowed 
Eisenhower to reach the top of the Army’s hierarchy. 
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In short, based on the Army Adjutant General’s and Jervey’s decision not to award the 
DSM makes it reasonable that the Army believed that because Eisenhower’s duties did not in 
combat in Europe or in a position of extreme responsibility, they were not exceptional or 
deserving of an award.  Colonel Welborn wrote in May 1922 that he was “so convinced of the 
merits and justice of such an award that I request I be called personally before the board.”118  He 
adamantly believed that Eisenhower not only deserved recognition for his service during World 
War I but also that it had been exceptional service.  Welborn pushed the office of the Army 
Adjutant General for four years before Eisenhower finally received his DSM in 1922.  The fact 
that he pressed for recognition for four years testifies to Welborn’s conviction that Eisenhower 
deserved recognition for his service at Camp Colt and may have reflected the degree of 
antagonism that still existed toward managerial leadership among many officers. 
In his DSM citation, Eisenhower was credited with “marked administrative ability” 
without reference to any position of extreme importance usually associated with the DSM.119  
The fact that there are two separate medals highlights distinct perceptions of actions in combat 
and abilities in critical positions.  It also shows that there is recognition for exceptional services 
rendered outside of combat.  It is unclear if the persistence from Colonel Welborn changed the 
board’s mind, or if it was a shift towards acceptance of managerial leadership.   The interplay 
between Welborn and the Adjutant General is an example of the ongoing transformation of 
leadership philosophies occurring within the Army.  On the one hand, the Army now recognizes 
exceptional organizational abilities, but is more likely to recognize those administrative abilities 
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if they have occurred at positions of great responsibly or at war.  It is also significant to note that 
Eisenhower had not received any award for his service during World War I until he received his 
DSM. 
 
 Service Schools and in the Service of Generals 
Eisenhower spent most of the interwar years serving as a staff officer for various generals 
and attending Army Service Schools.  He was passed over for command opportunities because 
he was “needed” on staff and repeatedly called upon for his diligent work.120  He finished first in 
his class at the Command and General Staff School, later called Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC), and received superior marks while at Army War College and Army Industrial 
College in 1928 and 1933, respectively.121  These schools were created as part of the Root 
reforms and the schools enhanced Eisenhower’s ability to succeed as a managerial leader.  These 
schools were crucial to refining his raw managerial skill, and his time spent under the tutelage of 
intelligent leaders solidified his leadership style.  He served under Generals Fox Conner, John 
Pershing, George Marshall, George Van Horn Mosley, and Douglas MacArthur.  Just as his 
postgraduate military education refined his managerial skill, Eisenhower’s time under the 
mentorship of great senior leaders, even if they were heroic leaders, propelled him to become a 
superior managerial leader. 
 At a fateful dinner party with Colonel George Patton, Major Eisenhower met General Fox 
Conner, who was thoroughly impressed with Eisenhower’s new ideas about the tank corps and 
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doctrine of mobility.  Patton and Eisenhower were among the few officers in the Army who 
advocated expanding the tank corps and the usefulness of mobile tank warfare.  In an article 
titled “A Tank Discussion” in the Infantry Journal in November 1920, Eisenhower had discussed 
the advantages and disadvantages of tanks as they had been used during World War I.  He argued 
that tanks were not just suitable for crossing trenches or for use in “stabilized conditions” with 
fixed lines.  Eisenhower listed the mechanical faults of the tanks of World War I and proposed 
updated requirements for future tanks, such as increased speed and mobility.  He also proposed 
tactics to improve the impact tanks had on the battlefield.  These combined movement of small 
units in close coordination with tanks to break through enemy lines quickly.122  It is also 
interesting that the lead article of the November edition in which Eisenhower’s article appeared 
was titled “Infantry: Its Role, Capabilities, Limitations, and Relation to Other Arms.” The author 
of that article, Colonel Robert McCleave, relegated the tank To just a supporting role and 
described infantry operations as a “matter of art.”123  McCleave’s notion that infantry was the 
center of the battlefield and everything else exists only to support the infantry reflected 
traditional thinking in the Army.  Whereas, Eisenhower’s doctrine of mobility with tanks was 
innovative.  McCleave wrote that battle revolved around the infantry and that “the infantry has to 
bear the brunt of the battle.”124  McCleave had a grasp upon combined warfare, but his mindset 
and strategy were still rooted in the military traditions from World War I.  Colonel McCleave’s 
central role of the infantry, and every other Army branch’s subordination to infantry depict a 
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traditional mindset of senior Army officers.  Maintaining this traditional approach to combined 
warfare, in spite of new technology and new ideas, is suggestive of a heroic leadership 
philosophy. 
Soon after that, General Conner asked that Eisenhower be his executive officer (XO) at 
Camp Gaillard in the Panama Canal Zone.  Eisenhower’s current commander, General Samuel 
Rockenbach, was against the assignment because he believed he could not spare any experienced 
staff officers.  The Army’s fraternal order enabled Eisenhower to go with Conner to Panama.  
Fox Conner had served with distinction under the command of General John Pershing, who was 
now Chief of Staff of the Army, during World War I.  This indirect connection between 
Eisenhower and the Army Chief of Staff tore through any ‘red tape” and secured Eisenhower’s 
position as the XO for General Conner.125  As part of the Army’s reduction following World War 
I, Eisenhower was reduced in rank back to captain. 
 Eisenhower’s duty at Camp Gaillard was “one of the most interesting and constructive of 
my life,” he later said, due to “the presence of one man, General Fox Conner.”126  Reflecting on 
that assignment, Eisenhower believed his time spent under the mentorship of Conner was pivotal 
and provided him the foundation required to succeed at Army service schools and while in 
command.  General Conner drilled and questioned Eisenhower incessantly on readings of 
Clausewitz, on the campaigns of the Civil War, and on the works of other military strategists.  
Eisenhower called his time with Fox Conner “a sort of graduate school.”  Not only was Conner 
preparing Eisenhower for success during his career with broad thoughts and adages, such as 
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“Always take your job seriously, never yourself.”127  Conner was also preparing Eisenhower for 
the rigors of CGSC.  Eisenhower was promoted again to major just prior to leaving Conner in 
August 1924. 
 The good-ole-boy system, or fraternal brotherhood, stepped in again to help Eisenhower 
get an assignment to Command and General Staff School.  General Briant H. Wells, Chief of 
Infantry, attempted to prevent Eisenhower from gaining entry into any Army service school.  It is 
probable that Eisenhower’s espousal of concepts of mobility through an expanded tank corps and 
his published article created discord between Eisenhower and the Infantry branch.  Fox Conner, 
who was now working for Army Chief of Staff General John Hines, had Eisenhower transferred 
to the Adjutant General Corps and placed on recruiting duty.  Given that Eisenhower was thus 
outside the jurisdiction of the Chief of Infantry, General Conner secured an appointment for 
Eisenhower to attend CGSC, for which Conner had diligently prepared Eisenhower.  General 
Conner wrote to a worried Eisenhower to reassure him that “you are far better trained and ready 
for Leavenworth than anybody I know.”  On two separate occasions, Eisenhower’s connection 
with General Fox Conner not only enabled him to do what Eisenhower wanted but also placed 
Eisenhower in a position to benefit from education to refine his managerial skill set.  Eisenhower 
later admitted: “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know.”128  Eisenhower’s use of the Army’s 
fraternal order demonstrates the possibility of an officer who favors managerial leadership 
philosophy using aspects of heroic leadership style.  There are times when heroic leadership and 
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managerial leadership styles act complementary.  Bradley is an excellent example of an officer 
who had the perception as a “soldiers’ soldier” while understanding the complex relationship 
between the fighting soldier, his equipment, and logistics.  Bradley was not tied down trying to 
figure out how a soldier moves while under fire.  As in the case of Eisenhower and Patton, who 
lean distinctly toward one philosophy of leadership. 
 Eisenhower called attending Command and General Staff School a “watershed” time in 
his life.129  His time spent wargaming and writing operations orders with Fox Conner had 
prepared Eisenhower to take full advantage of the education throughout the rest of his career.  
Eisenhower committed fully to his studies at CGSC and enlisted his friend from Fort Sam 
Houston, Major Leonard Gerow, who later commanded V Corps during Operation Overlord, as a 
study partner.  Together they retrofitted a makeshift command post in the extra space above 
Dwight and Mamie Eisenhower’s apartment.130  Their study together paid off as Eisenhower 
came out first among 245 graduates in their class, and Gerow was less than “two-tenths of one 
percent” behind Eisenhower in overall ranking.131  Eisenhower’s motivation to succeed, his 
organization and managerial skill, and his attention to detail proved “tailor-made” to benefit from 
instruction at Ft. Leavenworth.132   
 Another example of how the CGSC was a watershed moment for Eisenhower was that it 
served as a diverging point for him and Patton.  They espoused similar views of speed, 
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maneuver, and mobility regarding tank warfare.  But Patton changed branches, leaving the 
Infantry for the Cavalry, while Eisenhower remained in the Infantry.  Eisenhower leaned heavily 
on the importance and practice of planning and organization, but Patton espoused heroic traits 
that emphasized execution and immediate action.  Patton wrote to Eisenhower: “I don’t try for 
approved solutions any more but rather to do what I will in war.” He recommended to 
Eisenhower that he “stop thinking about drafting orders and moving supplies and start thinking 
about some means of making the infantry move under fire.”133  Patton’s heroic leadership 
philosophy toward warfare was in stark contrast with Eisenhower’s.  Patton did not see how 
management could be guided by leadership just as combat could be, so he was unable to see the 
merit in what proved to be crucial to Eisenhower. 
 Following attendance at CGSC in 1927, Eisenhower was assigned to the American Battle 
Monuments Commission under the command of General John Pershing and helped to write A 
Guide to the American Battlefields in Europe published in 1927.  Pershing praised Eisenhower’s 
performance in a letter to General Robert Allen, writing that Eisenhower “has shown superior 
ability not only in visualizing his work as a whole but in executing its many details in an efficient 
and timely manner” and holds “unusual intelligence and constant devotion to duty.”134  Although 
Pershing may not have subscribed to either managerial or heroic leadership styles, he saw the 
value of managerial traits.  Where before, he served on the western frontier in the late 19th 
century, there was little role for an officer’s managerial abilities.  The importance then, was 
action, not planning.  It was essential to the transformation from heroic leadership to managerial 
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leadership that even the most unlikely sources saw the value or usefulness of managerial skills.  
In 1927, Eisenhower was given a choice to attend Army War College.  Where he said: “For once 
the Department has given me the choice, and for once I’m going to say yes to something I’m 
anxious to do.”135 
 At Army War College from August 1927 to June 1928, Eisenhower graduated first in his 
class and maintained “superior” marks overall on each of his efficiency reports.  In his first 
report written by Major General Hanson E. Ely, who happened to serve with Douglas MacArthur 
during the Veracruz expedition, Ely observed that Eisenhower was a “superior officer” and 
“fitted for command and general staff duty.”136  General Ely’s comments were worded such that 
either heroic leaders or managerial leaders could see something good in Eisenhower.  
Eisenhower’s end-of-instruction efficiency report by General William D. Connor stated that 
Eisenhower showed “great promise” and was “generally superior.”  General Connor wrote that 
Eisenhower was “qualified for civilian contact and duty with civilian component” and rated 
Eisenhower as “superior” in every category except two: physical activity and military bearing 
and neatness.137  Eisenhower’s top marks from his time at the Army War College earned him the 
opportunity to choose his next assignment.  He chose to go back to the American Battle 
Monuments Commission.  For Eisenhower, the reason to return was two-fold.  It afforded him 
the opportunity to go back to work for Pershing, but, more important to Eisenhower, it allowed 
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him to travel to Europe.  It was during this time while working on Pershing’s memoir that 
Eisenhower first briefly met Colonel George C. Marshall, a trusted advisor of Pershing.   
 Following his time with the American Battle Monuments Commission, Eisenhower was 
assigned as the executive officer for General George Van Horn Moseley, serving Assistant 
Secretary of War Frederick H. Payne.  Eisenhower later described General Moseley as “a 
brilliant officer,” who pressed for the same interest in strategy and in studying military history as 
Fox Conner had when Eisenhower was in Panama.138  Eisenhower’s first assignment was to 
engage with industrial businesses to acquire the plans they had used in moving to wartime 
production during World War I and to learn if, in retrospect, they would have done things 
differently.  The office was figuring out whether industries had responded effectively to the 
needs of policy in wartime as set by the federal government.  The department was in the process 
of creating an Army Industrial College based on the office’s findings, a school that Eisenhower 
later attended and whose bane was eventually changed to the Eisenhower School of National 
Security and Resources Strategy.  In retirement after his Presidency, Eisenhower reflected that 
this had been his first early interaction with what he termed the “military-industrial complex.”139   
 Following his time at the Army War College in 1928, every subsequent Efficiency Report 
from 1930 onward rated Eisenhower as “superior” with a quantified rating of 7.0, except one as a 
6.2 when Eisenhower left MacArthur in the Philippines.  Even more interesting is that 
MacArthur did not sign the last efficiency report as he had done for the previous years.  Instead, 
it was written by Major General W.S. Grant.140  General Moseley wrote to the AG of the Army 
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that Eisenhower was “qualified to occupy positions of the highest importance in the military.”141  
Even Assistant Secretary of War F.H. Payne noted Eisenhower’s “special aptitude for quickly 
picking out the critical points in any subject.”142  Visitors to the War Department, such as 
Colonel McCammon, who heard one of Eisenhower’s lectures, commented on Eisenhower’s 
“thorough preparation” in treating topics that were “received by the audiences with the greatest 
interest.”143 
 Eisenhower came into his own as a managerial leader while serving on staff in 
Washington, D.C. under the tutelage of several renowned generals.  Their mentorship afforded 
Eisenhower the chance to attend critical service schools that helped refine his skills as a staff 
officer and managerial leader.  Eisenhower made full use of connections, such as were common 
practice in the Army for generations, and this helped him to be chosen to attend Army service 
schools.  But this did not mean that he gave priority to the self-focused heroic model of 
leadership that some of his own contemporaries, such as Patton, embraced.  Again, a major 
indicator of managerial leadership is the use of manipulation or persuasion.  Eisenhower’s 
likable personality, which often differed from the crasser or flamboyant personalities of heroic 
leaders, gave him a chance to use his direct and indirect connections to further his career.  It was 
Eisenhower’s personality that enabled him to manipulate or influence Conner to get him into 
CGSC.  That Eisenhower did not have to ask for this directly further shows the way he could 
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sway others to his advantage.  It was his likable personality and interpersonal skill that allowed 
him to network successfully while in Washington, D.C. to influence his next assignments, such 
as going back to the Monuments Commission following the Army War College.  Understanding 
that there were competing styles of leadership allowed Eisenhower to take advantage of both 
paradigms and what each leadership philosophy offered.  His detriment of not serving as a unit 
commander and remaining a skilled staff officer meant that the name of Major Eisenhower 
reached the ears of the most senior leaders during the interwar years.  His art of manipulation, 
making himself indispensable, and taking full advantage of his bureaucratic skills gave him the 
upper hand among his peers.144  Eisenhower’s time serving under the Assistant Secretary of War 
got Eisenhower noticed in Washington, D.C., particularly by Army Chief of Staff Douglas 
MacArthur, for whom Eisenhower occasionally worked, such as during the Bonus Affair (Bonus 
March) in 1932. 
 
 General Douglas MacArthur 
General Douglas MacArthur had an immense impact on Eisenhower, expanding the 
young staff officer’s experiences in military, civilian, and political matters.  Eisenhower served 
longer under the guidance of General MacArthur than under any other general.  While serving 
under MacArthur in Washington D.C., a repeated offense by MacArthur illustrates the difference 
between the two men. As part of his regular staff work, Eisenhower was required to travel from 
the office to the Capitol building. MacArthur “never once offered Eisenhower a ride in or use of 
the car.”  Eisenhower remembered the humiliation he felt having to return the extra fare change 
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and submit travel vouchers regularly.  He later recalled: “No matter what happens later you never 
forget something like that.”145  The implication here is that Eisenhower sees himself as an officer 
that absolutely would have offered a ride to a junior staff officer, where MacArthur did not.  
While this might not show a particular trend of leadership style, it indeed points out how 
MacArthur’s and Eisenhower’s mentality differed.   After serving as his aide when MacArthur 
was Chief of Staff, Eisenhower was arranged to serve under MacArthur when the General was 
appointed as Military Adviser to the government of the Philippines.  As Janowitz and Echevarria 
have observed, MacArthur was a clear exemplar of the heroic style of leadership.  MacArthur’s 
iconic image with a corn-cob pipe, his excellent rating of number one in his West Point 
graduating class, and his military upbringing point towards a heroic leadership style.  In addition, 
he crass decision-making, bravery, and willingness to lead from the front in a skirmish during the 
Vera Cruz Expedition and during World War I earned him two recommendations for the Medal 
of Honor. 
MacArthur was the son of General Arthur MacArthur, Jr., who himself had been awarded 
the Medal of Honor for heroic action during the American Civil War.146  Without question, 
Douglas MacArthur had much to live up to the image of his father.  MacArthur internalized these 
expectations and then met them by finishing first at West Point and set about to make a name for 
himself.  During World War I, he became famous for his specially made hat, riding crop, and a 
wool scarf around his neck.147  MacArthur sought to gain notoriety, fame, and glory.  While 
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serving in the 42nd “Rainbow” Division, which he helped organize, MacArthur received two 
Distinguished Service Crosses and seven Silver Stars for bravery in leading troops into battle.  
He was wounded and gassed twice by German forces and recommended for but denied the 
Medal of Honor on two separate occasions.  There could be no doubt in MacArthur’s mind that 
paper-pushing staff officers were jealous of him, a successful heroic officer.148   
As Army Chief of Staff, MacArthur led regular troops in Washington, D.C., including 
Major Eisenhower and Colonel Patton, to remove the “Bonus Army” in 1932.  The Bonus Army 
was made up mostly of World War I veterans, and their supporters, who sought immediate 
compensation for their services during the Great War.  Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley 
ordered MacArthur to clear the area of veterans and to demolish the condemned buildings.149  
MacArthur intended to command the Regular force against the protesters, and Eisenhower “told 
him that I thought this was inadvisable; that the Chief of Staff should not dignify the incident by 
going out himself.”150  The photographs, and written reflections of MacArthur and Eisenhower, 
reveal their respective personalities and opinions on the event.  MacArthur was standing with his 
hands on his hips, looking proud of himself, wearing his dress uniform adorned with every 
medal, sometimes sporting a cigarette dangling from his mouth.  In contrast, Eisenhower is 
standing in his quickly assembled bland uniform with a blank expression aptly capturing his 
words, “the whole scene was pitiful.”151  The tension between MacArthur and Eisenhower is due 
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in large part to MacArthur’s vain or self-oriented temperament which did not immediately mesh 
with Eisenhower’s likable personality.  To some degree, this difference of character continued 
through their time together in the Philippines. 
Indeed, it says something about Eisenhower’s managerial skill for MacArthur to request, 
or to more accurately put it, to tempt and trick Eisenhower with a possible future command 
position to keep Eisenhower on MacArthur’s staff.152  MacArthur went out of his way to prevent 
Eisenhower from command time, much to Eisenhower’s chagrin.  This was due in part to 
Eisenhower’s success at making himself indispensable and, as MacArthur put it, Eisenhower 
“invariably demonstrated an ability to organize complicated tasks quickly and efficiently.”153  In 
the Philippines, Eisenhower built a relationship with Philippine President Manuel Quezon, due in 
part to MacArthur’s unavailability and in part to Eisenhower’s congenial personality.  This 
allowed Major Eisenhower to have a significant influence over President Quezon’s decisions and 
made Eisenhower a useful instrument for MacArthur to exert influence on Quezon.  The 
relationship between Eisenhower and Quezon was strong enough that Quezon offered an award 
to Eisenhower in June 1942 after Eisenhower became the commander of U.S. forces in North 
Africa.154  In Eisenhower’s efficiency reports for 1934 and 1935, MacArthur gave him 
“superior” marks and wrote that “this officer has no superior of his age and grade.”155   
Eisenhower’s time in the Philippines illustrates the way in which he was stuck in limbo, caught 
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between his personal goals and those of one of the most senior officers in the army.  Eisenhower 
was trapped between his desires to take command, following traditional routes, while at the same 
time being an exceptional manager of personnel and equipment.   
Their personalities and leadership styles indeed clashed, but both officers appreciated 
each other’s skills for what they were.156  The tension between MacArthur and Eisenhower 
marks the paradigm shift from a heroic leadership style to a managerial leadership style in the 
Army at large.  Their specific leadership styles and preferences inclined them to give different 
interpretations and find different solutions to the same problems, such as the request to make 
MacArthur a Field Marshal in the Philippines.  Philippine President Quezon’s suggestion that 
MacArthur receive an appointment as Field Marshal of the Philippine Army generated tension 
among his staff.  Eisenhower wrote his position in his diary on February 15, 1936.  He presented 
two reasons why MacArthur should not accept the position, the more prominent being that 
accepting it would be antithetical to their mission as advisors.  Eisenhower stated that 
MacArthur’s appointment would “seriously handicap every effort on our part to secure the 
necessary cooperation from commanders and staffs in the American Army.”157  As said earlier, 
MacArthur sought fame and glory, so his decision was predictable.  MacArthur could never turn 
down the opportunity to receive more recognition and accepted President Quezon’s offer to 
become Field Marshal in the Philippine Army.  This arrangement was quite unusual in that 
MacArthur held two different ranks, one for the Philippine Army and the other for the U.S. 
Army, and received two separate incomes from each government. 
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In naming the Philippine Army’s Chief of Staff, Eisenhower showed his preference for 
Colonel Santos, over many generals.  He stated that “Colonel Santos is the only logical person to 
serve as Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army.  He understands organization and the necessity of 
systematic procedure in handling an army.”  Eisenhower described Santos as an administrative 
leader, which Eisenhower believed was greatly needed to help build and train the Philippine 
Army.  On this issue, MacArthur agreed with Eisenhower’s assessment but believed that the 
political climate was not stable enough to choose someone so junior to so influential a position. 
158  MacArthur was coaching Eisenhower on the importance of weighing political implications, a 
lesson that Eisenhower seemingly did not apply later in the invasion of North Africa.  As early as 
May 1936, however, Eisenhower had become increasingly exasperated with MacArthur’s 
unilateral or authoritarian decision making.  Without consulting his staff, MacArthur decided to 
expand recruitment from 6,000 to 40,000 Philippine soldiers.  Not only would this require more 
money to pay the men who were recruited, but it would also significantly increase the spending 
required for buildings, money that was not in the budget.  When Eisenhower and Major Jimmy 
Ord, a classmate from West Point, attempted to sway MacArthur’s opinion, MacArthur 
exploded.  In his journal that evening, Eisenhower vented his frustration: “he gave us one of 
those regular shouting tirades.  He seemed particularly bitter toward me.”  He goes on to list each 
of the arguments why MacArthur’s decision does not make sense, including lack of funds and 
the lack of any supply system to support any endeavors.    Eisenhower further wrote: “I argue 
these points with more heat and persistency than Jim – consequently I come in for the more 
severe criticism.”159  Though he has mellowed his written judgment in his diary, Eisenhower’s 
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frustration with MacArthur is quite clear.  Critical to the origins of this frustration is the 
difference in leadership mentality between MacArthur and Eisenhower.  MacArthur used a 
heroic leadership style and demanded an obedient staff.  In contrast, Eisenhower’s mentality 
assumed a collective mentality which clashed with each of their assumptions of leadership. 
MacArthur’s unilateral decisions made a mark upon Eisenhower’s opinion towards authoritarian 
leadership.  It solidified for him the importance of conferring with staff and building the right 
team to do so. 
In many cases, Eisenhower was commended for his organizational and diplomatic skills.  
In Eisenhower’s 1936 evaluation while in the Philippines, MacArthur wrote that Eisenhower was 
a “superior military essayist and analyst of military history.  Outstanding student in the 
application of mechanized equipment.”  The evaluation noted that Eisenhower was “especially 
suitable for civilian contact or duty with civilian components.”160  As a result of his many 
managerial successes, Eisenhower was promoted to lieutenant colonel within the regular Army 
in July 1936.  Eisenhower’s time with MacArthur and his growing relationship with President 
Quezon gave Eisenhower critical diplomatic experience, which expanded his managerial skill.  
MacArthur gave Eisenhower superior marks and a 7.0 rating for 1936, 1937, and 1938.  Given 
the close relationship with and availability of Eisenhower, President Quezon had an office 
prepared for Eisenhower in Quezon’s Malacañang Palace.  It was Eisenhower’s close 
relationship with Quezon that led to a major falling-out between MacArthur and Eisenhower in 
1938.  MacArthur wished to build Philippine morale by conducting a large demonstration or 
parade.  As a diligent staff officer, Eisenhower set out to plan the event, making inquiries where 
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necessary.  President Quezon got wind of this large demonstration and pulled Eisenhower into 
his office to discuss the plans.  Eisenhower gave information requested by the President only to 
find out that President Quezon knew nothing of the demonstration.  This created a firestorm 
between MacArthur and the Philippine government, and MacArthur viewed Eisenhower’s 
actions as disloyal to him and a direct violation of his authority.161  This forever soured the 
relationship between Eisenhower and MacArthur. 
In an interview in 1970, General Lucius Clay stated that President Quezon had made an 
offer to Eisenhower to replace MacArthur.  On the topic of Eisenhower’s reassignment back to 
the United States from the Philippines, Eisenhower stated that President Quezon “handed him a 
blank check,” and that Eisenhower could ask whatever he liked in an attempt to get Eisenhower 
to stay in the Philippines.162  Clay reaffirmed that it was Eisenhower’s success at managing and 
organizing, as well as his diplomatic ability, that gave him a chance to take Quezon up on this 
offer.163  In accordance with his official request to the U.S. Army, Eisenhower was recalled to 
the  United States in 1939, where he served under General Krueger and helped plan, organize, 
and execute the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers.  MacArthur seemed to take Eisenhower’s departure 
as an affront, which was reflected in a downgraded efficiency report for Eisenhower at 6.2 
instead of the 7.0 that had been customary.164  Ever since the misunderstanding in 1938 
involving MacArthur, Eisenhower, and President Quezon over the military parade, the 
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relationship between MacArthur and Eisenhower had been strained.  Even so, Eisenhower had 
gained immense experience during his time in the Philippines.165 
Eisenhower’s time under the tutelage of MacArthur in the Philippines and in intimate 
contact with civilian officials provided him with first-hand experience at organizing and training 
new units and at working with policymakers.  For the first time, Eisenhower was able to put the 
training he received at the Army War College and Army Industrial College to use.  In the 
Philippines, he was able to play a major role in developing policy and in organizing an army.  In 
one instance, Eisenhower was tasked with creating the budget for the Philippine army.  
Eisenhower’s laid out the number of howitzers, vehicles, “mobilization equipment,” the number 
of personnel, and operating costs.  MacArthur had asked several questions and offered alterations 
that Eisenhower quickly made.  Eisenhower must have done well enough in this task, because, 
shortly after, MacArthur asked Eisenhower to conduct a similar analysis through the year 
1939.166  Part of this analysis required Eisenhower to work with munition industries in the United 
States and to create a logistical network that supported the movement of equipment to and 
between the Philippine Islands.  Much of what Eisenhower knew of interdependence between the 
military and industry came from his time spent at the Army Industrial College.  His position 
forced him to work with politicians in the United States and the Philippines and with foreign 
military officers, and it required him to prepare complicated logistical plans for supplying the 
new Philippine Army.  Being the assistant to General MacArthur in the Philippines was a test of 
Eisenhower’s managerial skill. The Philippine experience helped shape his success during the 
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Louisiana maneuvers in organizing large amounts of personnel and equipment and put a 
spotlight upon his managerial skill. 
From Eisenhower’s time at West Point through his staff work with MacArthur in the 
Philippines, the experience developed Eisenhower’s managerial skill and continued to solidify 
his career as a staff officer.  It had been a long journey.  The personality he expressed at West 
Point was counter to the traditional and disciplined nature of West Point.  Eisenhower’s early 
career included some unremarkable postings until he was coerced into a position that required 
him to use organizational and managerial skill.  His work with the tank corps got him noticed 
and put Eisenhower on a path toward becoming a staff officer of superior managerial skill.  The 
Command and General Staff School was a watershed moment when he came to understand the 
essential nature of management, and this marked his most significant divergence from heroic 
leadership philosophy.  By the time that he left MacArthur’s service in the Philippines, 
Eisenhower had demonstrated an exceptional aptitude for organization and management, and he 
had shown diplomatic skill with civilian administrators.  When he arrived at the War 
Department, Eisenhower was an experienced and educated managerial leader prepared to make 
the most of operational planning for the war that Generals Conner and MacArthur knew was 
soon headed their way. 
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Chapter 3 - The Gamble for Managerial Leadership 
The interwar years had provided Eisenhower with education and experience that shaped 
his vision of managerial leadership.  Senior officers saw something of value in Eisenhower’s 
perspective and skills and placed him in successive staff positions where Eisenhower 
significantly influenced the direction of the U.S. Army.  As he had at Camp Colt during World 
War I, Eisenhower demonstrated his ability to manage and organize the training of recruits while 
chief of staff at Ft. Lewis, WA.  These rapid successes, as well as his reputation from the 
Philippines and Washington, D.C., got him reassigned to support 3rd Army under General 
Krueger for the Louisiana Maneuvers.  Marshall used these exercises to test the validity of new 
Army doctrine, as well as to prepare and test younger officers such as Eisenhower, who were 
progressive and open to new ideas.   Chief of Staff Marshall became sure enough of 
Eisenhower’s managerial acumen that he selected Eisenhower as the officer with the best chance 
of bringing victory in North Africa and then in Europe. Marshall was also putting managerial 
leadership to the test and thus sent Eisenhower to North Africa to gain desperately needed 
combat experience.  The combat experience he gained in North Africa proved critical.  
Eisenhower learned the “finer” points of going against a genuine enemy, and he also learned the 
essential nature of his relationships with his subordinates and of their relationships amongst 
themselves.  His realization of the importance of building the right team became the core around 
which Eisenhower built Operation Overlord.  The powerful attitude that “we cannot afford to 
fail” ensured the success of the operations in North Africa, in the Mediterranean, and in Europe. 
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 Louisiana Maneuvers 
The planning and execution of the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941 further refined 
Eisenhower as a managerial leader.  The exercises proved critical in testing new organizational 
methods and doctrine that stemmed from military reforms shaped during the interwar period.  
The maneuvers also prepared the peacetime Army for war, which was pushed vehemently by 
Chief of Staff General Marshall.167  The maneuvers also proved to Army headquarters that many 
generals were unfit to serve, and Marshall systematically removed them in favor of younger, 
more progressive and forward-thinking leaders.  Eisenhower is just one of the younger leaders 
who excelled during the Louisiana maneuvers, and he was rewarded for his efforts with a 
promotion to brigadier general. 
The Louisiana Maneuvers were the first extensive exercises held under the new Army 
organization and involved army-sized elements as well as new elements such as mixed 
mechanized-cavalry regiments.168  The “battling” armies were comprised of the 3rd Army, under 
the command of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, and the 2nd Army, under the command of 
Lieutenant General Ben Lear.  The Selective Training and Service act of 1940 had authorized the 
drafting of thousands of soldiers who made up a large portion of the troops during the Louisiana 
Maneuvers.169  The incorporation of draftee mobilization added to the realism of the exercises 
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and forced officers, at all echelons of command, to contend with large numbers of inexperienced 
but rudimentary-trained soldiers.170 
Before his assignment as the Chief of Staff of 3rd Army under Krueger, Eisenhower was 
posted to Fort Lewis, WA, where he served as the Chief of Staff for the 3rd Infantry Division 
and the IX Corps.  Following his time as Chief of Staff in the 3rd Infantry Division, Eisenhower 
was promoted to colonel in March 1941 under the National Defense Act, which created the 
Army of the United States.  Due to the Draft Act, Fort Lewis quickly became one of the busiest 
army posts in the country and was a management nightmare.171  Eisenhower later recalled: “A 
quick study of the problem showed that someone in the War Department had not done his 
homework.”  Eisenhower noticed that the staff’s training schedules were not realistic, the staff 
provided no logistical support for the increased equipment required, and the staff did not provide 
enough housing for the incoming troops.  Eisenhower set forth a plan to create areas of 
“concentration” or marshaling areas to mobilize and train troops.  He set up training and shipping 
schedules, no doubt aided by his experience in such matters from his work at Camp Colt during 
World War I.172  Major General Kenyon Joyce, commander of IX Corps, rated Colonel 
Eisenhower as “superior” in all categories except military bearing.  He added that Eisenhower 
was “an outstanding officer – one of the ablest in the army” and that “this officer is thoroughly 
qualified for division command.”173  His evaluation from IX Corps is one of many reports that 
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formed the trend to “superior” evaluations for Eisenhower since he learned advanced techniques 
on the science of management at Army service schools and practiced them during his time in the 
Philippines.  
General Krueger had had his eyes on Eisenhower for some time, placing Eisenhower first 
among his requests for a chief of staff in the fall of 1940, although Eisenhower was unavailable 
for reassignment.  Again, after taking command of 3rd Army, Krueger “urgently requested” 
Eisenhower to serve as chief of staff in June of 1941.  He stated:  
In my judgment, that position demands a younger man, one possessing broad 
vision, progressive ideas, a thorough grasp of the magnitude of the problem 
involved in handling an Army, and lots of initiative and resourcefulness. 
Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower, Infantry, is such a man.174  
Krueger was explicitly describing a managerial leader and believed that Eisenhower fit the 
needed role of a managerial leader. 
Eisenhower and Krueger were an excellent command team match.  Krueger was a heroic 
leader, who believed that “weapons are no good unless there are guts at both sides of the 
bayonet.”  He was often described as a “soldier’s soldier.”175  Krueger needed a chief of staff 
who had the staff experience that he himself lacked and who had foresight and initiative.  
Eisenhower filled that gap and was a complement to Krueger’s heroic leadership style.  
Eisenhower’s role in the Louisiana Maneuvers helped to identify failures and inefficiencies with 
the new Army structure.  He also conducted detailed inspections of field troops looking for 
innovations that could be used on a grander scale to help the armies.  One such example was a 
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cook who had begun cooking on stoves mounted on trucks which proved more efficient at 
feeding the troops.  Eisenhower saw the positive impact on the troops and touted this cook as an 
example.176  Eisenhower’s giving credit to soldiers coming up with innovative ideas is an 
example of managerial leadership. 
During the Louisiana Maneuvers, Eisenhower opened up to the press who enjoyed his 
“open, easygoing manner and his willingness to poke fun at himself and the army.”  Columnists 
Robert Allen and Drew Pearson praised Eisenhower and credited him with devising the 
operational strategy that defeated the opposition.177  His strategy to outmaneuver and outsmart 
General Lear received praise from local press and from Army HQ.  In reality, Eisenhower served 
as the Chief of Staff, a staff officer with no command authority; therefore, it is important not to 
trivialize the role of the commander, General Krueger.  It is the commander’s responsibility, and 
Krueger’s staff was there to make his job more manageable.  For recognition of his contribution 
in the Louisiana Maneuvers, Eisenhower received a promotion to brigadier general.  It is also 
interesting to note that two other up-and-coming officers received critical acclaim coming out of 
the Louisiana Maneuvers.  Brigadier General Mark Clark, who wrote the scenario for the 
maneuvers, and Major General Patton, who led an aggressive flanking maneuver that fully 
demonstrated the potential of the armored division, received promotions.178 
The Louisiana Maneuvers served three essential purposes.  General Marshal stated: “I 
want the mistakes made down in Louisiana, not over in Europe.”179  Marshall hoped that lessons 
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would be learned in these maneuvers rather than in combat at the cost of soldiers’ lives.  
Marshall also hoped to demonstrate to Congress the “deplorable state” of the Army and its 
unpreparedness for war.  The third purpose, one that Eisenhower pointed out, was to “eliminate 
unfit officers.”180  The Army forcibly retired hundreds of senior officers; in all, over thirty of 
forty-two commanders at division- and corps levels were relieved of command.  
The purging of unfit senior officers was one of several outcomes drawn from the 
Louisiana Maneuvers.  Another outcome was that armor operations proved critical; therefore, an 
independent anti-tank unit was justified.  Senior leaders also learned that massing and 
concentrating men and equipment would play a crucial role in a war of this scale.  For Marshall 
and Eisenhower, it firmly cemented Eisenhower’s position as a managerial leader in the coming 
war.  As noted earlier, Eisenhower was not the only senior leader to see the rising importance of 
staff officers and managerial leaders.  General Krueger gave him a glowing assessment in his 
efficiency report, and General Marshall brought him to Washington, D.C. to work in the War 
Department where he was promoted to major general in March 1942 after becoming Chief of the 
WPD. Krueger rated Eisenhower as “superior,” held that he was capable of commanding a 
division, and rated him second among 170 officers. 181  For a staff officer to be ranked higher 
than several corps, divisional, and regimental commanders was not insignificant, and it hinted at 
the importance placed on Eisenhower as a managerial leader. 
Eliminating senior commanders who were not just old but also unfit was a significant 
step in the Army’s shift from a traditional organization toward being an institution that 
recognized top-notch management as a key part of true leadership.  It is not the action of purging 
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older generals that exemplifies managerial leadership, but rather the consequence of these 
purges.  The replacement of hundreds of senior Army officers gave room for younger and more 
openminded officers.  The significance was the knowledge and understanding that the Army 
needed younger and more open-minded officers to lead the Army during the next war.  In line 
with Thomas Kuhn’s argument of a progressive transition between old ideas and new ideas, not 
every “old” general was swept away.  Some Spanish-American War veterans, such as MacArthur 
and Krueger, remained in important commands and still held influence. However, unlike some 
other more senior officers, MacArthur and Krueger understood enough about managerial 
leadership to incorporate management skills into their respective command staffs.  It also does 
not negate the existence of generals who were comparatively young and brash and sought glory, 
such as Patton.  The importance here lies in the fact that senior military leaders recognized the 
plethora of incompetent generals and purposefully pushed them aside in favor of younger and 
more progressive leaders.  General Marshall was able to use the Louisiana Maneuvers to justify 
the removal of unfit generals and to measure and groom commanders who would lead men into 
the upcoming war.182  Leaders like Eisenhower understood the details, planning, and 
management required to run modern mechanized armies. 
 
 North Africa 
Eisenhower’s work in the War Plans Division (WPD) to prepare for operations in North 
Africa and then their execution of those plans in combat generated the necessary integration of 
staff managerial skill that Eisenhower had improved since Camp Colt with combat experience 
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that he so desperately desired and needed.  For the first time, as part of the WPD, Eisenhower’s 
talent in operational planning was put toward near-future combat operations.  The measures that 
Marshall drew upon in reforming the Army and ones he tested in the Louisiana Maneuvers were 
consistent with what somewhat younger officers of a progressive ideology such as Patton, Clark, 
Eisenhower, and Bradley all considered worthwhile.  North Africa provided the opportunity to 
train the combat-inexperienced leaders further before they met the full power of the German 
military in Europe.  For the Army to accept completely the merits of managerial leadership, the 
deserts of North Africa had to be crossed first. 
Ever since the Louisiana Maneuvers, General Marshall had been grooming open-minded, 
progressive generals, such as Eisenhower and Bradley, for generalship in combat operations in 
Europe.  That Marshall picked Eisenhower to be the Chief of the WPD demonstrates the faith 
and confidence that Marshall had in Eisenhower and in his abilities as a managerial leader.  
Marshall stated that “General Eisenhower had a refreshing approach to problems.  He was most 
helpful.”183  It also points to the idea that Marshall already had Eisenhower in mind to become 
the Allied Commander in Europe.  Eisenhower mirrored Marshall in several ways. They both 
could get very heated, and they both detested stupidity and incompetence.  Eisenhower viewed 
Marshall as a quick and decisive leader, and he watched Marshall closely when Marshall 
engaged with civilian leadership; this was a task Eisenhower needed to master.184 
Eisenhower was an excellent choice to command U.S. forces in Europe and allied 
command in North Africa.  Eisenhower came to this new position with a promotion in rank to 
lieutenant general in July 1942.  From Marshall’s perspective, as noted earlier, Eisenhower came 
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into the position with a fresh outlook and an inquisitive mind.  Partly because of an outburst from 
Marshall in a meeting with Churchill, the British found Eisenhower more “affable” and 
congenial to work with.185  Eisenhower also came to the table with crucial experience from his 
time in the Philippines.  In the Philippines, Eisenhower had worked in a governmental 
relationship between the United States and the Philippines, where he worked through civilian, 
military, and industrial contracts.  As part of developing international relationships, he worked 
closely with heads of state, policymakers, and military leaders to coordinate their efforts for 
national defense.  This work was not unlike what he needed to do as the allied commander in 
North Africa.  Eisenhower was well placed to utilize his experience, integrating policy and 
strategy from two national governments to build a unified effort that satisfied each stakeholder. 
As leader of the WPD, Eisenhower now had to work closely with civilian policymakers, 
with the U.S. Navy, and with allies.  In his diary, Eisenhower noted his frustration working with 
the Navy and concluded sarcastically, “what a gang to work with.”186  Later he was more specific 
in his frustration.  He complained that “we spend our time figuring out how to keep from getting 
in each other’s way rather than in how to fight the war.”187  Eisenhower believed that, in its 
strategy for the Pacific Theater, the Navy called for an approach that would be too slow and too 
logistically intensive. He did however convince the navy of the importance of cargo ships and 
continued to micromanage the build-up of landing craft.188  As Eisenhower took over the WPD, 
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his diary recorded the importance he placed on logistics as key to stemming the tide of the 
Japanese advance, meanwhile focusing on preparing to hit Germany through Britain. 
In preparation for the eventual invasion of Europe, Eisenhower believed three 
fundamental steps were required: keep the line of supply open to Britain, keep the Soviet Union 
in the war, and hold the Middle East.189  Eisenhower focused his efforts on seeking to alleviate 
the pressure on the British in the Middle East, and North Africa seemed to fit the bill.  But 
getting the allies to agree on a plan was another problem altogether.  By taking Tobruk, German 
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel seemingly forced the Americans’ hand to support the British in 
North Africa by sending troops to relieve the pressure the British were facing.  Eisenhower had 
all but resigned himself to the desk job at WPD and recommended General Patton to take 
command in North Africa Since he was already training an armored division to face combat in 
North Africa.190 
Up until the Louisiana Maneuvers and his posting to the War Department, Eisenhower 
had sought command positions, tried to lead men into battle, and wanted to earn glory, as was the 
traditional path of an officer.  The traditional path of an officer was ingrained in Eisenhower who 
grew up in an army that emphasized heroic leadership, and it meant field command.191  A rare 
heated exchange between Marshall and Eisenhower illustrated the tension between heroic 
leadership and managerial leadership.  Eisenhower later recalled that General Marshall told him: 
“I want you to know that in this war the commanders are going to get promoted and not the staff 
officers.  Eisenhower…you are not going to get any promotion. You are going to stay right here 
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on this job and you’ll probably never move.”192   Eisenhower was greatly frustrated because he 
wanted desperately to take command in war, yet he knew that he was best suited to a managerial 
role.  In this instance, Marshall was giving voice to the Army’s preference still toward heroic 
leadership but fully aware that the immense scale of personnel, equipment, and logistics needed 
to execute invasions required a managerial leader. 
Thankfully for Eisenhower, Marshall’s statement did not hold, and he was made 
commander of the U.S. forces in Europe in June 1942.193  Eisenhower had recommended 
General Joseph T. McNarney as the American commander, with General Mark Clark as the II 
Corps commander.194  Eisenhower’s recommendation of Clark demonstrates his preference for a 
managerial leader, a preference he later changed in tapping the heroic leader Patton.  On June 11, 
1942, Marshall asked Eisenhower if the plans for Europe were complete, which Eisenhower 
responded, “yessir.”  Marshall continued: “That’s lucky, because you’re the man who is going to 
carry them out.”195  In his diary, Eisenhower showed no emotion and simply wrote, “The Chief 
of Staff says I’m the guy.”196   
It seemed that Marshall’s emphasis on having fresher commanders supported the decision 
to make Eisenhower the commander of U.S. troops in Europe, but Eisenhower was untested and 
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without combat experience.  As part of easing the burden felt by British forces in the Middle East 
and Africa, the allies sent Eisenhower to North Africa.  In North Africa, as the new Commander-
in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the Mediterranean, Eisenhower intimately 
understood the logistical complexities, writing to General Marshall that “the difficulties, as 
presented by the air, the ground, and the supply organizations, are tremendous.”197 
Communications problems always presented a challenge, but they were amplified during 
invasions or at the beginning of campaigns.198  Among the problems experienced in the Tunisian 
Campaign, Eisenhower cited several instances where radio communications prevented timely 
reports, such as, on one occasion, stating that “owing to bad radio conditions reports today have 
been meagre.”199  Early in this campaign, it became critical for Eisenhower to establish formal 
diplomatic agreements, as well as some gentlemen’s agreements, to smooth over antagonisms 
that existed between the American and British militaries.200   
His diplomatic skills were also put to the test while conducting negotiations with Admiral 
François Darlan, the de facto leader of Vichy France in North Africa.  Eisenhower attempted to 
woo Darlan to the Allied cause to sign an armistice and not to engage allied troops during 
Operation Torch.  Darlan was the Chief of the French Navy and served as a key leader in pro-
German Vichy France.  In an attempt to limit the fighting between French forces in North Africa 
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and the allies during Operation Torch, Eisenhower sought the cooperation of the Vichy Regime 
in North Africa.  After it became apparent that General Henri Giraud’s authority would not be 
recognized by Vichy forces in North Africa, Eisenhower struck a deal with Darlan.  Eisenhower 
acknowledged Darlan as the military commander-in-chief and civilian head of state for French 
North and West Africa.  This enabled Eisenhower, through Darlan, to command French forces to 
join with the allied forces against German forces.201 
Again, Eisenhower’s noteworthy managerial skill played to his advantage as he used his 
skills of persuasion and compromise to come to an agreement.  His ability to work with civilians, 
as he did in North Africa, was something previous commanders had commented on in nearly 
every efficiency report following CGSC.202  His time at Army service schools, notably the Army 
Industrial College, had improved his ability to work with policymakers, such as Darlan, who was 
now de facto head-of-state in North Africa.  This skill was further polished during his time with 
MacArthur in the Philippines.  Eisenhower was forced to defend his actions on all fronts – before 
senior military leaders, the press, and civilians.  Eisenhower’s justification for the agreement 
with Darlan was that “we are engaged in a military operation whose purpose is to secure North 
Africa.” Eisenhower’s reasoning was based on military necessity, and he did not worry much 
about the media fallout or political implications.  He further criticized the pundits, saying to the 
press and the War Department that “we did not find the ideal Frenchmen which our critics see 
from the heights of their ivory towers.”203  The fact that he was not relieved of command 
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indicates that either the transgression was not that grave or that his diplomatic acumen was up to 
the task to defend his decision.  Both Roosevelt and Churchill backed up Eisenhower, 
understanding the military necessity of gaining an ally in North Africa, and they attempted to 
downplay the controversy.204  
Before significant operations and during the build-up before them, Eisenhower leveraged 
his managerial skill.  With an expert understanding of logistics and military operations, he 
ensured proper personnel and material support, enlisted civilian auxiliary support where needed, 
and secured command authority under his office. From his earliest days in the WPD, Eisenhower 
pushed for expanded production of landing craft, because he was certain that any invasion would 
require extensive use of landing support.205  Whether attempting a deal with Henri Giraud, or 
with Darlan, Eisenhower understood the importance of establishing civilian control to maintain 
access to infrastructure to establish supply points for the North African campaign.  Maintaining 
command authority under his position as the allied commander was a continuing preoccupation 
for Eisenhower.  Eisenhower attempted to assess his subordinates to place them in the most 
suitable roles to support operations in the upcoming campaign.  As a managerial leader, 
Eisenhower chose to select staff and subordinates whose strengths and expertise balanced his 
own skill, such as selecting Naval Captain Harry C. Butcher as a naval aide.  Butcher was 
preferred not for his strategic acumen but for his journalistic skill.  In order to assemble the most 
respectable plan, Eisenhower put together a team that worked well under his leadership and 
guidance. 
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North Africa proved to be the combat training ground for General Eisenhower.  
Operations during the Tunisian campaign came to a screeching halt as winter weather and the 
strain on the logistics system compelled Eisenhower to consolidate and wait for favorable 
conditions.  By early 1943, Allied Force Headquarters had started to operate more efficiently. 
Creation of standardized forms to handle the tremendous number of outgoing and incoming 
messages and cables streamlined staff processes.  For the most part, the standardized forms 
replaced disorderly memoranda and handwritten notes.206  As part of his day-to-day 
communications, Eisenhower interacted with a constantly changing mix of dynamic military 
personnel with varying leadership styles and personalities.  Part of being a managerial leader is 
the ability to adapt to different personalities to streamline communication or to influence the 
interaction to create a favorable outcome. 
How Captain Harry C. Butcher came to be Eisenhower’s naval aide is an excellent 
example of the way that Eisenhower employed his understanding of heroic leadership philosophy 
to control the system to get the aide that he wanted.  Before the war, Butcher had been a 
correspondent with CBS, and he was commissioned into the Naval Reserves after Germany 
invaded Poland in 1939.  Butcher met him while then Major Eisenhower was working in 
Washington, D.C. for the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff MacArthur in the early 1930s.207  
The request for Butcher had to go through Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations 
(equivalent to Chief of Staff Marshall), with whom Eisenhower did not get along well.   
Eisenhower once wrote of King: “One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to 
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shoot King.”208  This is an apt example of the existence of interservice rivalry, or at the very least 
of personality conflict, and the persistence of the infamous Eisenhower temper. 
To get Butcher on orders as his naval aide, Eisenhower had to adapt to King’s traditional 
naval mentality and manipulate the transaction in his own favor.  This request was highly 
unorthodox – no Army general had ever requested a naval aide before.  The unorthodoxy most 
likely lent a hand in accepting the request.  Eisenhower did not need to give all of his reasoning 
before King agreed, who accepted the proposal, possibly because King hoped it might expand 
the Navy’s influence within Eisenhower’s staff.  Eisenhower’s actual reason for requesting 
Butcher was more personal.  He argued: “I’ve got to have someone I can relax with, someone I 
can trust absolutely.”209  On the surface, Eisenhower was building his team as part of his usual 
managerial style of leadership, whether that team player is practical or symbolic, as in this case.  
The deeper meaning illustrates the way Eisenhower could pull strings or favors, in the sense of 
the fraternal order, to get what he wanted. 
A fraternity is categorized under a traditional or heroic leadership philosophy.  
Throughout his career, Eisenhower took care of his friends and classmates.  His repeated use of a 
trait defined within a heroic leadership style shows the way in which he used different paradigms 
of leadership philosophy.  He appealed to a managerial philosophy when he recommended 
Patton for promotion by emphasizing his organizational skill, not his aggressive and mobile 
military tactics.  He stated that Patton “operated in a semi-independent status during the 
 
208 Entry March 10, 1942, Box 1, Folder DDE Diary Jan. 1 – July 6 1942, Eisenhower Diaries, EL. 
209 Kenneth S. Davis, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier of Democracy (NY: Konecky & Konecky, 1945), 302-3, 
quoted in, D’Este, Eisenhower, 310. 
85 
preparatory period and showed organizational ability in the preparation of his task force.”210  As 
another example, Eisenhower pulled strings to ensure the early promotion of his civil affairs 
officer, Colonel Julius Holmes.  He described Holmes’s great ability in working with civilians 
and cited his previous diligent staff work, adding that a promotion “would enhance his local 
prestige” with civilian leaders211  In his recommendation, Eisenhower portrayed Holmes as both 
a managerial and heroic style leader, ensuring that Holmes would appeal to different types of 
leaders.  Eisenhower also used his position and the fraternal organization routinely to help the 
war effort or his friends.  In a letter to Vice Admiral Russell Waesche, Commandant of the Coast 
Guard Academy, Eisenhower urged him to accept Stanley Smith’s resignation from the Coast 
Guard so he could join the Army.  Eisenhower commented that “his classmates consider him one 
of the outstanding men of the class.”212  This letter is another example of the way in which 
Eisenhower successfully used the traditional Army system to pull favors in his direction.  It is 
important to understand the difference between a “recommendation” and telling or “urging” 
someone to help in a situation.  Eisenhower was now part of the Army’s fraternity and had 
enough rank where when he “asked” for something, it was less of a recommendation and more of 
pulling favors.  Understanding the paradigm shift from the heroic and to the managerial 
leadership style enabled Eisenhower to actively portray himself and other officers as favoring 
traditional or managerial as needed. 
 
210 DDE to GCM Recommendations for Promotion, 19 November 1942, Box 131, Folder Cables Off. GCM/DDE 
Nov. 12, 1942 – Mar. 27, 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers Pre-Presidential Principle 1916-1952, EL.   
211 DDE to GCM Recommendations for Promotion, 14 December 1942, Box 131, Folder Cables Off. GCM/DDE 
Nov. 12, 1942 – Mar. 27, 1943 (3), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers Pre-Presidential Principle 1916-1952, EL.   
212 Letter from Eisenhower to Vice Admiral Waesche, 8 May 1942, Box 1, Folder General Historical February – 
May 1942, PR, EL.  
86 
If the Tunisian campaign was Eisenhower’s combat training ground, then the Battle at 
Kasserine Pass in February 1943 was his most trying ordeal.  Just days before the events, 
Eisenhower had been promoted to 4-star general on February 11, 1943.  In a report to 
Washington and London, just before the battle at Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower and his staff were 
completely unaware of the movements of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps.  This 
suggests one of Eisenhower’s noted failures – failing to secure accurate intelligence.  Eisenhower 
and his staff had anticipated “limited attacks” by the Germans to protect their lines of 
communication.213  U.S. reserves were moving up and battered units withdrawing.  Eisenhower 
gambled that he could swiftly move to take Tunis, which would have kept Rommel 
backpedaling.   
His venture proved unsuccessful because the inexperienced commanders failed to 
recognize the weaknesses in the American position.  Eisenhower attributed the Allied failure to 
four primary causes: “long-shot gamble to capture Tunis quickly,” poor intelligence, failure to 
understand enemy capabilities, and “greenness, particularly among commanders.”214  
Eisenhower and his staff were no longer planning in a vacuum, and their decisions yielded very 
real results.  The price of Eisenhower’s lack of combat experience, paid in the lives of his 
soldiers, came to “192 killed, 2624 wounded, 2459 prisoners and missing.”215  Learning the 
importance of careful management of the positions of armies, corps, and divisions, and ensuring 
continuous reinforcements of men and materials to these units were some of the critical lessons 
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learned by Eisenhower.  At the same time, Eisenhower was confident that his men were learning, 
too.216 
Eisenhower also had failed in other respects.  He failed to relieve General Fredendall, 
before or during the German attack.  During an inspection of the II Corps area, that Fredendall 
failed to attend, Eisenhower recognized the complacency in soldiers under Fredendall’s 
command but failed to act.217  Nor did he replace Fredendall when it became apparent that the 
Germans had overextended themselves and that Fredendall nonetheless remained in a defensive 
posture.  The Army as a whole learned much from Kasserine Pass, but Eisenhower had learned 
as well.218  Eisenhower relieved Fredendall of command of II Corps on March 5, 1943 and 
replaced him with Patton, who had been leading the western task force.219  In a letter dated the 
next day, Eisenhower told Patton that he intended to be “cold-blooded” in replacing any 
commander not up to the task.220 
In his diary, Eisenhower noted some of the lessons learned and the changes implemented 
immediately following the battle at Kasserine Pass, such as the reorganization of the air units, 
which Eisenhower believed had failed to provide adequate support for the ground forces.221  The 
need to ensure that ground forces had sufficient air support was a lesson that proved immensely 
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valuable to Eisenhower, who tightened control of the Army Air Corps.  He believed the Army 
Air Corps had failed to respond adequately to ground forces during the battle.222  This point 
proved important enough for Eisenhower to threaten resignation over it before Operation 
Overlord.   He demanded direct control of the Eighth Air Force for bombing French civilian 
railways and road networks.  This controversial air campaign resulted in the deaths of over 
60,000 French civilians.223  Eisenhower’s experience in North Africa provided him with 
feedback that improved his leadership skills, such as his diplomatic negotiations and how he 
might better organize Operation Overlord. 
Within managerial leadership, one of its most notable traits is the ability to put together 
teams, ensure collaboration, and hold them together.  When he told Patton of his own need to be 
“cold-blooded,” Eisenhower showed that he realized that he had failed at the critical task of 
managing the very best team.  He now saw that he needed to continually assess his team.  On 
June 11, 1943, Eisenhower wrote in his diary his current assessments of the key officers under 
his command.  He offered glowing remarks about General Mark Clark, who “is the best 
organizer, planner, and trainer of troops I have yet met in the American army.”  But he later 
admonished Clark for his decision not to accept command of II Corps from Fredendall and 
believed that it was a “bad mistake on Clark’s part.”  Of General Omar Bradley, Eisenhower 
wrote, “this officer is about the best rounded, well balanced senior officer that we have in the 
service.”  In what he said about Bradley and Clark, Eisenhower was applauding traits that he saw 
in himself; he praised them as fellow managerial leaders.  His description of Patton depicted a 
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straight and narrow heroic leader.  Eisenhower said that Patton “is a shrewd soldier who believes 
in showmanship to such an extent that he is almost flamboyant. He talks too much and too 
quickly and sometimes creates a very bad impression.”224  These descriptions are quite revealing 
of Eisenhower himself, who favored managerial leadership but relieved a commander whom he 
thought would serve well training troops at army command level and replaced him with a heroic 
leader.  This decision demonstrates that Eisenhower believed that managerial leadership had 
failed in the battle at Kasserine Pass.  The units and troops in II Corps needed a strong 
“flamboyant” heroic leader to whip them into shape.  This was in contrast to his earliest 
assessment that a managerial leader, such as Clark, was the right man for the job.  Further 
attesting to the concept of balancing heroic and managerial leadership, Eisenhower quickly 
placed Bradley, a “well-balanced” officer, in charge of the II Corps following Patton’s tenure as 
commander.  North Africa taught Eisenhower how to better assess the leadership styles and 
abilities of his subordinate commanders and staff and saw that he would need to be “cold-
blooded” if necessary. Eisenhower kept this lesson in mind as his team began to plan for 
Operation Overlord, which made him more insistent on getting his way in determining 
commanders and command structure for the invasion of Europe. 
 
 The Team for Operation Overlord 
In preparation for Operation Overlord, Eisenhower assessed and built his team, 
developed relationships among the allies, and dealt with friction that existed among his 
subordinate commanders.  The planning for Overlord was the culmination of years of sharpening 
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Eisenhower’s managerial skill during the interwar years under the service of great generals, in 
the Philippines with MacArthur, and in the combat experience in North Africa.  For years, 
Eisenhower was relegated to serving as a staff officer and worked at the pleasure of his 
commander.  His role was reversed when he took command of allied forces in North Africa, and 
the Battle of Kasserine Pass demonstrated that there was still a period of adjustment – 
Eisenhower’s transformation was not immediate.  Eisenhower had failed to accurately assess his 
command team and staff officers, and he had not properly delegated authority.  These lessons 
were learned at the expense of soldiers’ lives, and his written assessments of his most important 
subordinates from June 11, 1943 illustrate his resolve to do it right for the invasion of France.225  
Operation Overlord was primed to be the most important test thus far for Eisenhower, and the 
Army, on the validity of managerial leadership. 
The lesson of building an efficient and capable team was emphasized during the 
numerous reviews of the plans for Operation Overlord and the planning of this next campaign.  
The fact that Eisenhower requested direct control of long-range bombers came from his 
perception of that bombers had failed to support U.S. troops during the Battle at Kasserine Pass.  
In part, the desire to exert control over air support, through the IX Fighter Command, was why 
Eisenhower chose to keep Pete Quesada.  Quesada’s ideas about providing tactical support were 
close enough to Eisenhower’s notions of ground support that Eisenhower could keep Quesada in 
place and thus benefit from apparent continuity.226  Eisenhower hoped this move might solidify 
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aerial ground-support for the invasion.  In a report to the Adjutant General of the War 
Department (AGWAR) regarding Operation Overlord, Eisenhower stated that his team was:  
Convinced that in all discussions full weight must be given to the fact 
that this operation marks the crisis of the European war.  Every 
obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered, and every 
risk run to ensure that our blow is decisive. We cannot afford to fail.227 
Further, in his review of the plans in January 1944, Eisenhower and his team settled on the 
narrow corridor for the invasion.  They asked that more reserve divisions be prepared to ensure 
that a continuous supply of men and material came ashore.  Eisenhower, his staff, and his 
subordinate commanders were fully aware that, if the men and supplies stopped coming ashore, 
the amphibious assault would likely fail.  The fact that he called for more landing craft, escort 
vessels, and additional bombers reflects lessons he had learned from the amphibious landings in 
Sicily.228  Before going to North Africa, Eisenhower had been correctly obsessed with the 
production and procurement of landing craft. As early as February 1942 and again in May 1942, 
Eisenhower demanded an answer from the Navy on who would be responsible for procurement 
of the landing craft, what types of craft were needed, when would the craft be ready, the 
suitability of the types of craft, and the number of boats required to move entire units.  His years 
as a staff officer had honed his attention to detail, and he understood that the details would make 
or break the cross-Channel invasion.229 
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His allusion to “commanders-in-chief,” or his team, and the fact that they all reviewed the 
operational plans together exemplify his coaching and buy-in mentality.  His repeated use of the 
term “we” instead of “I” demonstrates his mindset of a “team” mentality and buy-in when 
planning for Operation Overlord.230  Instead of calling on heroic dominance and telling his 
subordinates to “do this because I am the commander,” Eisenhower used compromise or 
persuasion to be sure to tap the best and strongest efforts.  His time in North Africa and Sicily 
had given him and his commanders the experience they needed to make the most of the planning 
for Operation Overlord.  Eisenhower built his team with support from General Marshall and 
ensured that this same team would stick together for the best results.  Eisenhower understood that 
keeping a majority of the same staff and leaders would enable quicker and better efficiency, and 
so he asked that his leading subordinates remain under his command for the invasion of France. 
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, General Omar Bradley, and General George Patton 
joined Eisenhower to execute Operation Overlord.  It was not that Eisenhower was simply 
looking for the best commanders; he was looking for the best commander in each specific role.  
For example, in preparation for the allied armies’ linking up following the invasion, 3rd Army 
commanded by Patton fell under XII Army Group commanded by Bradley.231  Both Bradley and 
Patton were excellent generals, but Eisenhower recognized each general’s particular style of 
leadership and where best to use it.  Even though Patton had seniority over Bradley in years of 
service, and over Eisenhower as well for that matter, he was placed in a field army command.  
Eisenhower knew that Patton was a “fighting general” and that he would likely succeed at 
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maintaining an attack upon the German army.  Bradley, as a “well balanced” leader, would know 
how to effectively support an aggressive general, while coordinating and managing four armies, 
twelve corps, and over forty divisions in a coordinated effort.  The heroic and managerial 
philosophies, then, were not necessarily opposed.  They could be effective in a complementary 
relationship. 
  Keeping this team of excellent military commanders together depended on 
Eisenhower’s pushing when necessary and also on compromising when needed.  He had largely 
failed at this task in North Africa, and this shortcoming had contributed to the disaster at 
Kasserine Pass and the replacement of Fredendall by Patton.  As Carlo D’Este has noted, 
Eisenhower had “failed to galvanize his commanders” in the quick pursuit of German forces 
during Rommel’s organized withdrawal.232  Therefore, extra attention and effort were placed on 
the interservice and allied relationships.   
While Eisenhower was planning and organizing what he had called the “great and noble 
undertaking,” Eisenhower was forced to deal with demands on his time to exercise negotiation 
skills to settle concerns.  As a managerial leader with significant experience as a staff officer, he 
was well suited to the task of working with civilians.  His previous experience in the Philippines 
and in working with policymakers in Washington, D.C. provided ample opportunity to refine his 
diplomatic skills.  On numerous occasions, his efficiency reports described him as well suited for 
“contact with civilians.”233  On one occasion, Winston Churchill had sought passage aboard a 
command ship to “view” the invasion.  Eisenhower had to insist, as he said soon after the war, 
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that “the chance of his becoming an accidental casualty was too important from the standpoint of 
the whole war effort, and I refused his request.”234   
 The reality of this situation aptly demonstrates Eisenhower’s successful use of 
manipulation to meet his objectives best.  Eisenhower could not “refuse” or order the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom to do anything, even if he was right.  Through an unknown 
person, King George VI of England had learned of the Prime Minister’s plans and decided that 
he would come along as well.  The King argued that, if it was the duty of the Prime Minister to 
witness the invasion, then the King was also obligated to be at the head of British troops.  The 
gravity of the situation was apparent to Churchill; he deferred to the King’s wishes.235  
Eisenhower had made the issue loud enough to reach the ears of the King, who shared 
Eisenhower’s logic against Churchill going aboard ships during the invasion.  Eisenhower 
understood the importance of treading carefully among allies so as not to create an incident or 
redirect attention where it did not need to be.  Eisenhower had learned the lesson of considering 
political ramifications from his negotiations with Darlan, in Vichy-controlled North Africa, 
where he was forced to struggle with both media and politicians. 
Friction existed between British and American commands, especially regarding 
Montgomery and Bradley.  While in North Africa, Eisenhower had described Montgomery as “a 
very able, dynamic type of army commander.”  But he also cautioned that “he needs a strong 
immediate commander.  He is intelligent, a good talker, and has a flare [sic] for 
showmanship.”236  The need for a strong immediate commander was a fair assessment of 
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Montgomery as he had once told Patton to ignore orders that he did not like.237  His evaluation of 
Montgomery was not unlike his assessment of Patton regarding rhetoric and showmanship.  
Eisenhower’s Deputy Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, raised concerns about 
Montgomery’s unwillingness to execute orders as directed.  During the invasion of France, 
Tedder had a “fear that General Montgomery may, while agreeing in general terms with you, fail 
to act on its implications.”  Tedder further supported his claim that Montgomery was not 
following orders as directed by describing that he “can see no grounds for satisfaction with the 
operations in the Eastern Sector.”  Montgomery’s apparent disinterest in seizing the airfields 
around Caen, a primary objective early in the Normandy landing, justified Tedder’s concern.238 
Tedder’s concerns about Montgomery corresponded with the friction that existed 
between Bradley and Montgomery.  Regarding the relationship between American and British 
commanders, Bradley stated: “Had [Field Marshal Harold] Alexander commanded the 21st 
Army Group in Europe, we could probably have avoided the petulance that later was to becloud 
our relationships with Montgomery.”239  He further wrote that “quite often during the war I 
disputed Monty’s views, challenged his decisions, and questioned the wisdom of his moves. Like 
the rest of us, Monty is mortal; and being mortal, he has made mistakes.”240  Bradley further 
insisted that “this attitude never impaired the personal and working relationship that existed 
between us.”241  Given the knowledge of the strained relationship between Bradley and 
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Montgomery, the latter statement is likely untrue.  The antagonism between the pair showed 
itself during the Battle of the Bulge when Bradley was cut off from some of his units, who then 
fell under Montgomery’s command.  Bradley was upset at the idea that his forces would fall 
under another commander, let alone fall under the command of Montgomery. 
Part of the friction between Bradley and Montgomery can undoubtedly be attributed to 
the differing styles of warfare between the American and British armies.  Using Bradley’s 
description of British techniques, he eloquently described the differences in command styles.  
Regarding military orders, American troops carried out orders instantly, whereas British orders 
were “a basis for discussion between commanders.”  Differences in opinion would be fleshed out 
and revised in an amended order.242  For Bradley, one of the most significant differences 
between American and British approaches toward the conduct of war was the view of 
exploitation and “agility of command.”  According to Bradley, where U.S. forces “preferred to 
push ahead…in an effort to prevent a fluid front from hardening into a set battle,” the British 
held an “apparent reluctance to squeeze the utmost advantage out of every gain or success.”  
Bradley added: “Monty insisted upon a ‘tidy’ front.”243  The conflict that existed between U.S. 
and British commanders went beyond personality conflicts, like the one between Eisenhower and 
King, but included characteristic differences of opinion about warfare.  Eisenhower had to spend 
much time alleviating friction within his command and easing diplomatic pressures that 
interfered with his war effort.  Among these efforts were certain trips to Montgomery’s 
headquarters to “secure Montgomery’s agreement” or “to make sure that the attacks…are 
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continued as planned.”244  His managerial efforts helped reduce tension among his commanders, 
and his command of persuasion ensured they would support the overall operation. 
Creating working relationships with his subordinates while assessing their individual 
strengths and weaknesses was critical for Eisenhower to create and sustain an efficient team. 
Eisenhower’s managerial leadership skills were honed by years of military education.  He had 
come a long way from the young officer who sought deployment during World War I and glory 
on the battlefield.  He no longer envisioned himself as anything other than a managerial leader, a 
self-image that was solidified following CGSC.  His insistence on managerial leadership never 
weakened his sense that traditional or heroic leaders were also needed; in short, he recognized 
that heroic and managerial leadership could coexist.  Eisenhower understood the decisive role 
that heroic leadership had during a time of war.  Eisenhower’s reactions to two separate incidents 
regarding Patton’s behavior show this point.  First, in response to the infamous “slapping 
incident,” Eisenhower told General Marshall:  
I have to take responsibility for this volatile fellow.  He does the kind 
of fighting I like.  He has a certain feeling.  He isn’t like every fighter.  
He is a great pursuer but there’s very few of those fellows….  I’ll take 
care of Georgie.245 
In Eisenhower’s report of the incident to AGWAR, Patton, while in command of the 7th U.S. 
Army invading Sicily, had encountered two “unwounded” soldiers in the local hospital who 
seemed to be physically fit for duty who had been evacuated for “nerve difficulty or what is 
commonly known as ‘Battle Anxiety.’”  Eisenhower then went on to explain his actions taken: 
I took the following action. First, I wrote General Patton a letter telling him of the 
allegations, expressing my extreme displeasure and informing him that any 
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repetition would result in his instant relief. I told him further that he would 
necessarily make, on his own initiative, proper amends to the individuals 
involved, and if necessary, he would take the necessary steps to make the proper 
amends before his whole army.246 
It is hard to tell if this mild punishment from Eisenhower was due to the relationship and 
friendship that he had with Patton or due to Eisenhower’s need for Patton as a field 
commander.  Later in December 1943, in response to a letter from Marshall and 
suggesting his fear of losing Patton, Eisenhower shrewdly wrote: “As a final word, I want 
to say again we should not lose Patton’s services somewhere as an Army commander.”247 
Second, Eisenhower upheld his confidence in his friend following a press release in 
which Patton was reported to be critical of allied policy and Eisenhower’s decisions.  An 
investigation later found that Patton had made the remarks in circumstances in which he had felt 
some pressure and that at first he had tried not to make any statements.248  Eisenhower 
understood that he and Patton had divergent styles of leadership, and Eisenhower understood that 
there was a specific role in the way that Patton and those like Patton conduct war.  The crisis of 
the war in Europe made it necessary to accept certain flaws, such as defiance, in favor of an 
aggressive leader who can get the job done better than most.  Patton also had a feud with General 
Jacob Devers, with which Eisenhower was also forced to contend.  In one of several reports to 
Marshall to smooth over Marshall’s discontent with Patton, Eisenhower assured Marshall that 
the two generals could work together: 
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It is my impression that Devers and Patton are not congenial. You see I am being 
perfectly frank with you because I have nothing but impression on which to make 
that above. I think however that both of them are sufficiently good soldiers that 
possible personal antagonism should not interfere with either one doing his full 
duty.249  
In these incidents, Eisenhower successfully used the art of persuasion to help his friend, which 
ensured that the team would stay together. 
Operation Overlord took years of planning and months of detailed analysis aimed at 
ensuring the success of the most critical operation in the war.  The cross-Channel invasion of 
France required a force of over 150,000 allied troops, 5,000 ships and landing craft, 12,000 
aircraft, and 1,500 tanks to create a 60-mile-long beachhead at Normandy.250  The logistical feat 
of concentrating and then deploying a force of this size is almost incomprehensible, yet the team 
that Eisenhower put together was able to accomplish just that.  Of the burden of command for 
this operation, Eisenhower wrote June 3, 1944: “Probably no one who does not have to bear the 
specific and direct responsibility of making the final decision as to what to do can understand the 
intensity of these burdens.”  He continued with a discussion in which he weighed the importance 
of timing, weather, and the airborne operation, and the possible implications of any delay.251  It is 
not just that a managerial leader successfully executed the most massive and most complex 
amphibious invasion in modern history but that after the invasion Eisenhower remained in 
command.  For his performance and the importance to the allied armies, Eisenhower was 
promoted to 5-star General of the Army on December 20, 1944, just days before the German 
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counterattack beginning the Battle of the Bulge.252  He was promoted just days after the 
promotion of Marshall and MacArthur to the same rank, respectively.  The gamble of favoring 
younger and more progressive, or managerial, leaders such as Eisenhower and Bradley, proved 
successful.  Their success during World War II solidified the transition from heroic to 
managerial leadership and brought a rehabilitated focus to leadership within the U.S. Army.253 
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Conclusion - Reflections on Managerial leadership 
Eisenhower’s experience at the Command and General Service School firmly cemented 
his position on managerial leadership before World War II.  This watershed moment in his career 
shaped his perspective, enabling Eisenhower to translate his refined administrative skills into 
useful managerial action as a staff officer.  He was not the only senior leader to come to this 
realization.  General Krueger gave Eisenhower glowing remarks on his efficiency report, and 
General Marshall brought him to Washington, D.C. to work in the War Department.254  
Eisenhower’s time spent under MacArthur’s tutelage in the Philippines and the intimate contact 
he had with civilian officials gave him first-hand experience at organizing and training new units 
and working with politicians.  His experiences in the Philippines helped shape his success during 
the Louisiana maneuvers and put a special spotlight upon his managerial skill.   His years of 
experience as a staff officer and what he learned in his time at Army service schools made 
Eisenhower the leader to whom Marshall and President Franklin Roosevelt could entrust the 
country’s chance to win the war.  Before the decisive moment could be reached, Marshall 
ensured that such officers as Eisenhower, young and progressive officers with an appreciation for 
managerial leadership, also received much-needed combat experience in North Africa and Italy.  
The efforts in North Africa proved immensely valuable in teaching these officers several hard 
lessons, which translated into the successful completion of Operation Overlord.  The detailed 
planning, teamwork, and administrative capability needed for success in Operation Overlord 
proved the necessity of managerial leadership in modern war.  Managerial leaders’ success in the 
war established managerial leadership as the Army’s new leadership paradigm. Postwar 
 
254 Efficiency Report Jul-Dec 1941, 21 January 1942, Box 4, Folder Efficiency Reports 1941-1945, PR, EL. 
102 
command arrangements also reflected this shift with Eisenhower serving as the next Army Chief 
of Staff and then as the first NATO commander and with Bradley becoming the first Chairman 
of the Joint Chief of Staff, a post which unequivocally requires a managerial leader. 
From the time he graduated from West Point until the time he demonstrated his potential 
at Camp Colt, Eisenhower’s earliest reports were unremarkable.  His evaluators used non-
specific and generic traditional words to offer general encouragement to a junior officer.  
Descriptions such as “attention to duty,” “satisfactory,” or “professional zeal” were used often.255  
These early reports highlight that Eisenhower was adequate in the eyes of his commanders who 
did not value managerial skill.  Although he may have been well-liked as a football coach, his 
skills as perceived by traditional leaders were average.  During his early years between his 
graduation from West Point to his attendance at the Command and General Service School in 
1922, Eisenhower may not have even recognized that his aptitude for organization would take 
him on a path toward a managerial leadership style.  Following his success as commander of 
Camp Colt and after his attendance at CGSC, Army War College, and the Army Industrial 
College, Eisenhower improved his managerial skill.  Following his time at the Army Industrial 
College, Eisenhower dealt with the existence of both the heroic and managerial leadership 
philosophies and interacted with various “heroic” types and with “managerial” types and he 
recognized that this could be done for the good of the overall military effort. 
Eisenhower was a part of a fraternity within the Army.  He took care of his friends and 
classmates, who also looked out for Eisenhower earlier in his career.  The appointment of Harry 
C. Butcher is a good example of a case where Eisenhower pulled favors for a friend, or more 
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truthfully, for himself.  Eisenhower consciously understood and applied both paradigms of 
leadership style.  Counterintuitively, Eisenhower appealed to a managerial perspective when he 
recommended Patton for promotion or leveraged the fraternity to help his civil affairs officer.  
Eisenhower used his position and the fraternal organization to help the war effort or his friends.  
The paradigm shift from heroic to managerial leadership style allowed Eisenhower to leverage 
both perspectives to help him build his team.  His ability to persuade or influence others is 
characteristic of managerial leadership.  By the end of World War II, Eisenhower clearly grasped 
the future of the managerial style of leadership, which preferred open-minded officers.  
Nevertheless, he had not forgotten the existence of a seniority-based organization. 
In a letter to General Thomas T, Handy in 1945, Eisenhower stated his position about the 
possible forced retirement of senior Army leaders over 50 years old – a policy for which Upton 
had pushed.  Further clarifying his position on seniority, Eisenhower expressed disdain for even 
considering a promotion for Brigadier General Ernest J. Dawley.  Eisenhower noted that “the 
fact is that he is fifty-nine years old and has not performed in this war in such a manner as to 
warrant considering him for further use.”256  Eisenhower was attacking the old seniority-based 
promotion system, instead favoring younger officers who might prove to be more useful.  
Favoring younger officers and relieving incompetent leaders had been goals of George Marshall 
during the Louisiana Maneuvers as well.  Marshall also alluded to the significance of the 
managerial leader when he congratulated Eisenhower on a magnificent job, saying that 
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Eisenhower had “triumphed over inconceivable logistical problems and military obstacles.”257  
Significant to the final transformation of Eisenhower’s understanding of effective leadership was 
his endorsement for General McNarney as his replacement due to his “recognized administrative 
ability” despite Eisenhower’s previous misgivings about McNarney’s handling of his wartime 
command.258 
One of the most telling lines in Eisenhower’s thoughts on managerial leadership came in 
his letters to his son, John, when he was going through the Academy at West Point from 1940 to 
1944.  In one letter, Eisenhower divulged the secret of leadership: “If an officer can keep his 
position of authority, without ever losing it, and at the same time make his men feel that 
everything that affects them affects him also, then he will never have any trouble with discipline, 
training, or effective action.”259  Eisenhower talked about team building and investment, two 
critical components of managerial leadership.  In an earlier letter, Eisenhower was more direct 
about the importance of cooperation when he stated that “the necessity for teamwork is so 
impellent that a leader on the battlefield must be rather well trained” in various sciences of the 
military.260  In both instances, Eisenhower believed that leadership is a “matter of influencing 
people,” or to use Janowitz’s term, manipulation, as opposed to a dominative style of 
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leadership.261  Eisenhower emphasized team building, not because it was new but because he 
believed it was better.  He believed the Army had not always preferred team building. 
Eisenhower started his career in the military fully enveloped in an Army practicing heroic 
leadership.  Because of the prominence of heroic leadership, Eisenhower’s discipline problems 
and dislike of tradition made him unremarkable in his early career in the Army.  During the 
interwar years, his managerial skills were both a blessing and a curse.  He was regularly called 
upon for his managerial services and continued to perform in an exemplary manner.  However, 
this in turn kept him from command opportunities, especially while in service to General 
MacArthur.  His time in the service of generals heightened his managerial skill, gained him 
mentorship, and brought him into the Army’s fraternity.  By the end of his time under the 
tutelage of Army Chief of Staff Marshall and after his subsequent service as Commander-in-
Chief in North Africa, Eisenhower had a better understanding of the alternative paradigms of 
leadership that existed within the Army. 
His skills as a master organizer and team-builder epitomized the managerial style of 
leadership.  He was able to leverage the traditional methods of leadership through persuasion.  
Technology and the immense scale of war further intensified the capability and need, 
respectively, to summon leaders who had managerial skills.  This transformation of the concept 
of leadership from heroic to managerial leadership reflected changes and trends within society.  
The focus on reforming officer education fell squarely within societal trends for the 
professionalization of occupations, which is what the Army was attempting to do with the officer 
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corps.  Eisenhower helps to show how the U.S. Army moved from a focus on “heroic” leadership 
toward “managerial” leadership. 
It is also interesting to consider the possible connection between the rise of managerial 
leadership during World War II and its excesses during the Vietnam War.  Managerial leaders 
took advantage of communications technology, which enabled company commanders to 
micromanage their respective platoons across the battlefield.  Company influence on platoons is 
to be expected, but brigade and divisional micromanagement became possible as 
communications technology continued to improve and proliferate.  The expanded reach of 
policymakers to commanders in the field further increased the micromanagement of operations 
during the Vietnam War.  General Westmoreland had called excessive supervision by politicians 
a “disease,” but this term might equally be applied to the micromanagement of small-unit 
operations.262   
Regarding managerial leadership and micromanagement, the difference between World 
War II and the Vietnam War is not necessarily only a difference in the communications 
capability.  The mere fact that a capability to communicate exists does not automatically require 
that it be used at all, let alone misused in micromanagement.  The daily communication between 
Eisenhower and Marshall demonstrated that Marshall had the capability to micromanage but also 
that, on numerous occasions, he explicitly chose not to supervise too much.  The question then 
shifts to the mentality of senior leaders and to the philosophy of managerial leadership.  In what 
way did managerial leadership continue to change so that, having been a leading actor during 
World War II, it became a villain during the Vietnam War? 
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